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This study examines the relationship between the race of victim and combination of 
victim and offender races on a prosecutor’s decision to seek the death penalty. The 
objective is to offer an updated look at the Georgia capital sentencing system between 
1995 and 2004. In an older Georgia study based on data from the 1970s, race of 
victim was found to be of critical importance in capital case processing. Given the 
changes that have occurred in Georgia’s death penalty system to address disparate 
sentencing along with the number of years that have gone by, an argument can be 
made that a more current investigation may yield new findings. Using data from the 
Atlanta Constitution Journal, a logistic regression analysis is conducted. Results 
reveal that although race of victim is still relevant to a prosecutor’s decision to seek a 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
There is no such thing as a perfect social system. Criminologists and 
practitioners are all too familiar with the formidable challenge of evenhandedly 
administering justice in all circumstances. Overtime, the American criminal justice 
system has struggled to gain and maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of the public and 
to debate over the fairness of capital punishment is a quintessential example.  
Purpose of the Study 
This thesis will examine whether the race of the victim and the combination of 
victim and offender races influence the decision made by a prosecutor to seek the 
death penalty in the state of Georgia. To meet this end, I control for a number of both 
legal and extralegal factors
1
. The purpose of my thesis is to extend past research by 
introducing an analysis of new data for the state of Georgia ranging from 1995-2004.  
Thus far, the most comprehensive and insightful study conducted on race and 
capital sentencing is by Baldus, Woodworth and Pulaski (1990). Their research 
focused on the charging, conviction and sentencing processes in Georgia from 1970-
1979. Given the decades that have gone by, it is quite possible that the results of the 
current investigation may not be the same as those found in the past by these scholars.   
A legal argument could be made that since the late 1970s, Georgia has had more 
experience and time to adjust to legislation instituted to combat racially charged 
                                                
1
 Extralegal factors include such things as race, gender, and social class and are considered to be an 
illegitimate basis for decisions by criminal justice actors. 
Legal factors include such things as type of crime, level of aggravation in a crime, and criminal history 
and are considered to be a legitimate basis for decisions made by criminal justice actors. They relate 
directly to the criminal behavior in question. 
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decision-making. In the previous study on Georgia, the researchers only had data up 
to three years after the new capital sentencing protocol was implemented in 1976. As 
it is, receiving a death sentence is a rare event and so the ability to evaluate outcomes 
in death cases over a period of only three years may be overly ambitious. 
Particular attention will be paid to the argument that the dimension of racism 
has been merely transformed from its more overt form in the past into a more 
subjective or subtle form in our current time. For example, a practice specifically 
targeting Black offenders for execution is a more overt form of racism. Alternatively, 
disproportionately executing those that kill white victims could be viewed as a subtle 
or ‘repackaged’ form of racism because discrimination is indirect. 
Importance of the Study 
An updated evaluation of Georgia’s death penalty is necessary to determine if 
legal prescriptions have created significant change in how death eligible cases are 
processed, especially when it comes to race. One would hope that in the many years 
since the last study conducted in Georgia, race no longer matters. It is not 
unreasonable to therefore infer that since our society has progressed and become 
much more socially diverse (e.g. religious pluralism, immigration, sexual orientation 
etc.) the affects of this changing landscape would translate into our legal system.  
Overview 
The first recorded execution took place in the Jamestown Colony of Virginia 
in 1608 (Edelman, 2006). Since that time, the discourse on capital punishment has 
oscillated between executions viewed as morally reprehensible (Mooney and Lee, 
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2000; Henderson, 2006) or executions as untenable given their inability to deter crime 
(Sellin, 1959; Bowers and Pierce, 1973; Zimring and Hawkins, 1986; Radelet and 
Akers, 1996; Bailey and Peterson, 1997; Dolling, et al., 2009). Overtime, the extant 
literature on the death penalty has expanded its focus to include disparate outcomes in 
sentencing (Blume, et al., 1997; Berk, et al., 2005). Legal challenges to the 




All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 




 amendment which guards against the following: 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.  
 
 Three critical Supreme Court rulings have crafted the modern dialogue on 
capital punishment and race. The 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia ushered in a 
new era when it was decided that while capital punishment itself may not be 
inherently unconstitutional, the arbitrary process that results in disparate outcomes is 
unconstitutional. At this time, the death penalty in the U.S was effectively rescinded 
on the condition that states would revamp their capital trial procedures in an effort to 
rid the system of unfettered discretion. In 1976, the Gregg v. Georgia decision 
reinstated the death penalty with the Supreme Court accepting the ‘Georgia model’ of 
capital sentencing procedure. In addition, the Court ruled on related cases Proffitt v. 
Florida, Jurek v. Texas, Roberts v. Louisiana and Woodson V. North Carolina. 
Finally, the 1987 ruling in McClesky v. Kemp was an important turning point in the 
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way that the federal system viewed claims of sentencing discrimination based on 
race.  
This thesis will be broken down into several parts. Chapter 2 presents a 
background on the topic including why race is an important factor in justice research. 
This chapter also incorporates a synopsis of death penalty history through the 
experience of black Americans, key theoretical perspectives on the topic as well as 
the relevant Supreme Court rulings on executions and sentencing disparity. Chapter 3 
is a literature review that outlines the body of research on race and capital sentencing 
as well as the role of the prosecutor in decision-making. Chapter 4 is dedicated to my 
research methods and data. Chapter 5 will present results and analysis of the data. 
Finally, Chapter 6 centers on a discussion of the findings, concluding thoughts on 
what the current study means for race and capital punishment as well as potential 











Chapter 2: Background 
 
 
It is difficult to have a balanced discussion on the death penalty without 
referencing race. In 2003, Amnesty International published a report that highlighted 
an interesting fact: although whites account for less than 50% of homicide victims, 
nearly 80% of those executed since 1976 have been convicted for the murder of white 
victims (Amnesty International Report, 2003). Most recently, the Criminal Justice 
Project of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) published updated figures further illustrating this disparity. Table 1 shows 
the breakdown of offender-to-victim racial combination data for each execution in the 
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13    (1.14%) 
 
0         (0%) 
 
0      (0%) 
 
0       (0%) 
 
2  (0.18%) 
TOTAL: 891  (78.43%) 142  (12.50%) 61 (5.37%) 21  (1.85%) 2  (0.18%) 
Table 1 
Defendant-victim racial combination (Executions, 1976-2009) 
 
Note: In addition, there were 19 defendants executed for the murders of multiple victims of different races.  Of 
those, 11 defendants were white, 5 black and 3 Latino. (1.67%)  
Source: Death Row U.S.A (Winter 2009), A quarterly report by the Criminal Justice Project of the NAACP 







Discrimination and disparity are among the most important questions that 
arise concerning race and the justice system. Walker et al. (2007) defines disparity as 
“a difference but one that does not necessarily involve discrimination…a difference 
that can be explained by legitimate factors” (18). On the other hand, discrimination is 
“a difference based on differential treatment of groups without reference to an 
individual’s behavior or qualifications” (18). Figure 1 displays the discrimination-
disparity continuum ranging from one extreme of systematic discrimination to 














On its face, Table 1 clearly shows that black victim cases are 
underrepresented and white victim cases are overrepresented based on their 
Systematic                 Institutional                    Contextual                   Individual Acts of                   Pure Justice 
Discrimination      Discrimination                 Discrimination                  Discrimination  
Definitions 
! Systematic discrimination--Discrimination at all stages of the criminal justice system, at all 
times, and in all places 
! Institutionalized discrimination—Racial and ethnic disparities in outcomes that are the result 
of the application of racially neutral factors, such as prior criminal records, employment status, 
and demeanor. 
! Contextual discrimination—Discrimination found in particular contexts or circumstances (e.g. 
certain regions, particular crimes, or special victim-offender relationships). 
! Individual acts of discrimination—Discrimination that results from the acts of particular 
individuals but is not characteristic of entire agencies or the criminal justice system as a whole 
! Pure Justice—No racial or ethnic discrimination at all 
 
Figure 1 




percentage in the total number of murder cases. However, one must not automatically 
dismiss the possibility that legally justifiable reasons exist for why there are 
significantly higher levels of executions for those that kill white victims. One 
plausible explanation is that white victims’ cases may display higher levels of 
aggravation thus increasing the likelihood of a death sentence. On the other hand, it 
may be true that discrimination occurs and justice actors specifically target 
individuals that kill white victims for execution. The point of the matter is that we 
cannot be sure just by looking at the raw data because there is a fundamental 
difference between disparity and discrimination. These numbers invite deeper 
exploration into the nature of the relationship between race and capital sentencing. 
Why Race?  
I have decided to use race as my key independent variable because research 
has suggested that race plays a role in determining who is more likely to receive the 
death penalty (Paternoster and Brame, 2008; Paternoster, et al., 2004; Phillips, 2008; 
Baldus et al., 1990; Bowers and Pierce, 1980). The ability of the criminal justice 
system to act impartially is called into question when extralegal factors help to 
explain case processing. A justice system that discriminates based on race cannot 
uphold the good faith claim that it equally represents and protects the rights of all 
those subject to its laws. This infringes on its claim to be a legitimate social 
institution. As one author puts it, “a comparatively excessive death sentence offends 
basic constitutional notions of justice” (Baldus, 1986:137). There also exists the risk 
of alienating minority groups by reinforcing the long-held perception that the 
government and its laws were created for the benefit of the majority. Finally, if the 
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“death worthiness” of an individual is partially determined by skin color, it means 
that the American legal system is not as far removed from its disgraceful racial past, 
as we would like to believe. 
My interest in race stems from the fact that it has always been a contentious 
feature in the study of crime, justice and social problems in general. The claim of 
racial injustice is a serious accusation that, when confirmed, contravenes the principle 
of living in a ‘melting pot’ society where everyone, regardless of race, culture or 
ethnicity, is considered to be a valued piece of a single fabric. In cases where such 
assertions are debunked, the lingering resentment directed at those who opt to ‘play 
the race card’ attests to the potency of using race to explain differing treatment or 
experiences. In either case, race and any injustice attached to it have a way of riling 
up passions that are not easily quelled.  
It is not a novel argument that the legal system has perpetuated the belief that 
the lives of whites are worth more than those of blacks. For instance, historic laws 
that dictated black men would receive an automatic death sentence for the rape of a 
white woman but mentioned no such punishment for the rape of a black woman are 
indisputable (Wriggins, 1983)
2
. In modern times, common rhetoric includes the 
claims that instances of police brutality and profiling are most often made by Blacks 
in disadvantaged communities. The argument follows that law enforcement is more 
likely to view whites as a group to be protected but blacks are to be contained and 
surveilled (Kennedy, 1997).  
                                                
2
 The author briefly discusses the Penal Codes of states including Georgia (1816), Pennsylvania (1700) 
and Virginia (1819), which outlined that death be the punishment for a slave or free person of color 
that raped a white woman. However, white men convicted of raping a black woman could be fined or 
imprisoned at the discretion of the court. 
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On the other hand, there is a new and emerging outlook about race relations 
that suggests we have entered into a ‘post racial’ America. From this perspective, the 
increasing number of successful minority groups in the arena of television, 
journalism, professional sports, politics and higher education suggests that race is no 
longer a barrier to success or a factor in decision making (Wise, 2009).  As a result, 
Blacks (or other minority groups) are no longer justified in using race as an excuse 
for their disadvantage. 
 In short, there are alternative views on the enduring consequence of race. 
Some feel that it still matters a great deal, especially within the law, while others feel 
that we have moved beyond that reality. Evaluating race effects and the justice system 
is a useful strategy to either prove or disprove claims of racial injustice and/or 
determine whether the safeguards we have set up to get rid of racial injustice, 
especially within capital punishment, are actually working.  
 Moreover, the decision to use race as the key independent variable for this 
investigation did not come about without considering the complex literature on this 
topic. Traditionally, race has referred to biological differences between individuals 
including skin color, color and texture of hair and facial features (Walker et al, 2007). 
Overtime, our society has come to realize that clear-cut distinctions based on race are 
nearly impossible to make. For example, how do we categorize mixed race people 
and their experiences? Race is best described as a label or “social construct” instead 
of a naturally occurring characteristic that distinguishes between individuals or 
groups (Rodriguez, 2000). Despite its social construction, we continue to give race 
real currency in our everyday interactions.  
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Finally, I decided against using ethnicity in this investigation. Ethnicity refers 
to “differences between groups of people based on cultural customs, such as 
language, religion, foodways, family patterns, and other characteristics” (Walker, et 
al.2007: 10). Ethnicity is a complicated construct because of its broad and 
overlapping nature. For example, Hispanic is an ethnic designation that could include 
members from any racial category so it is difficult to offer meaningful insight into 
how one’s “ethnic origin” subjects them to particular kinds of treatment. A more 
practical reason for excluding ethnicity from this study is that the dataset did not have 
enough cases on Hispanic or Asian groups to offer meaningful evaluation. Instead, I 
only analyzed cases that included solely black and white defendants and victims. 
Why Georgia? 
 Georgia is central to this investigation because I was able to obtain rich data 
that provided information on death eligible cases for the years 1995-2004. 
Furthermore, Georgia is the ideal setting for such an inquiry because this state has 
been the historic battleground upon which legal contestation regarding the death 
penalty has been fought. Prior to 1972 when the application of the death penalty had 
been ruled unconstitutional, Georgia had carried out the most executions in the 
twentieth century (Bright, 2006). Since then, Georgia has consistently been ranked as 
one of the top execution sites in the country (Death Penalty Information Center)
3
. All 
of these factors lead me to conclude that Georgia acts as an ideal ‘litmus test’ for 
whether much has changed when it comes to investigating the relationship between 
race and the death penalty. 
                                                
3
 The death penalty was officially re-enacted in Georgia on March 28th, 1973. The first execution after 
that event did not take place in Georgia until 1983 (Death Penalty Information Centre). 
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Capital Punishment and the Black Experience 
It has been said that the 1960s and 1970s were “the most turbulent in all of 
American criminal justice history” (Walker, 1998:180). The term “social revolution” 
is the most accurate in describing these decades. Although the Vietnam War 
demonstrations, women’s rights protests and Motown pop culture were in full effect, 
one issue remained at the forefront of the American experience during this era: race. 
Racial inequality in the U.S was met with strong opposition with the growth 
of the civil rights movement. Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia represented target 
locations of the movement given the acute contentious relationship between blacks 
and whites in the Deep South. Activists such as Martin Luther King Jr. and Medgar 
Evans advocated against the informally sanctioned mistreatment of blacks within 
their communities. Civil rights leaders were also dedicated to addressing what Black 
Panther Party affiliate Stokely Carmichael coined as ‘institutional racism’ 
(Carmichael, 2005). 
One such sphere in which Black grievances were strongly felt was the legal 
system. For centuries, blacks in America were vulnerable to a kind of rogue justice at 
the hands of slave patrols and lynch mobs. In 1704, the colony of Carolina enacted 
the south’s first Patrol Act. The act stipulated that patrols were to prevent any type of 
congregating among blacks by immediately dispersing of them and searching their 
homes and possessions at will (Reichel, 1988). It appears that slave patrolling was not 
just about catching runaway slaves but also to prevent any type of gathering of blacks 
because of the threat of a potential uprising. In contrast to the modern police that 
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developed from the Anglo Saxon model in the early 1830s, police in the South were 
organized for the specific purpose of regulating the black population (Dulaney, 1996).  
The relationship between blacks and the justice system, from its inception, has 
been characterized by bitterness and suspicion to say the least. In 1857, as Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court, Roger Taney demonstrated how the justice system felt 
toward blacks when he emphatically stated in a majority opinion that blacks were “so 
far inferior that they had no rights, which the white man was bound to respect” and “ 
of an inferior order, altogether unfit to associate with the white race.”
4
 Blacks were 
subjected to “Slave Codes” which were laws instituted to manage the ever growing 
slave population (Ogletree and Sarat, 2006). For example, a black person that had hit 
a white person even in self-defense could face execution. Also, whatever possessions 
a slave had were considered the property of their enslavers. With the formal end of 
slavery and the advent of the era of Reconstruction, the resulting hostility and 
violence between blacks and whites continued. White Americans, particularly in the 
South, resented the new freedom of blacks and perceived a loss of privilege that they 
once had. In an effort to replicate the forces of slavery, “Black Codes” were instituted 
to help whites maintain their dominant social, economic and political leverage 
(Ogletree and Sarat, 2006).  
Black Codes were strict laws stipulating that black men were, for example, 
required to remove their hats in the presence of a white man and required to have a 
license to carry a knife or gun, unlike a white person (Ogletree and Sarat, 2006). The 
number of reported lynchings escalated after Reconstruction, presumably as a way for 
                                                
4
 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857). The majority opinion ruled that all blacks whether 
slave or free were not and could never become citizens of the United States. 
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whites to express their anger with the changing social system (Ogletree and Sarat, 
2006). Kennedy (1997) notes that between 1882 and 1968, at least 4, 743 lynchings 
were recorded in the United States and 72% were inflicted on blacks. The states with 
the ranked top five worst records for lynching were Mississippi, Georgia, Texas, 
Louisiana and Alabama. With the migration of Blacks from the South to the North, 
the dynamic of race relations changed. Blacks were in a better position to find jobs, 
education and, most importantly, become better organized politically and socially. 
The Jim Crow Era opened the door to another form of racial practices aimed 
at legally restricting the civil rights of blacks. Jim Crow emphasized segregation of 
the races from buses, bathrooms, movie houses and schools (Ogletree and Sarat, 
2006). Jim Crow laws were different from Black Codes because they sprung from 
different circumstances, the former coming well after Reconstruction. Jim Crow did 
not provide for the rampant use of execution as punishment as did much of the Black 
Codes. While the outward display of harsh punishment became much less common 
than the extreme cases of castrations and lynchings that had dominated the preceding 
decades, the status quo remained (Ogletree and Sarat, 2006). For most of history, 
blacks have been the majority of those executed by the government. Race cannot be 
separated from the history of capital punishment.  
Conflict and Racial Threat Perspectives 
 In general, race and its relation to the justice system can be understood 
through the lens of several theories. An example is conflict theory, which is a branch 
of critical criminology and fundamentally recognizes crime as a social construction 
(Quinney, 1970). In other words, what our society has come to perceive as ‘criminal 
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behavior’ does not have its origin in a higher moral order. Instead, our understanding 
of crime comes about because of how we are raised and is essentially based on what 
society deems criminal through its laws. Conflict theory posits that law is created 
through conflict and “competition over money status and power” (Vold et al., 2002: 
227). The state “does not represent common interests, but instead represents the 
interests of those with sufficient power to control its operation” (228). Put in another 
way, those in power define what behaviors are criminal and what actions should be 
punished most harshly, usually to the disadvantage of those who lack power. 
 This theory appropriately depicts the plight of lower class Blacks in the 
criminal justice system. For example, crack cocaine is merely a different form of 
powder cocaine but the average sentences for crack cocaine possession are 
substantially higher than for powder cocaine, 100:1 (Walker et al., 2007). Blacks are 
the highest percentage of users of crack cocaine. As a result, predominantly poor 
blacks end up with longer prison sentences compared to others (largely middle to 
upper class whites) that use cocaine.  
 Using the language of conflict theorists, it could be said that crack cocaine 
laws are an attempt by those in power (middle to upper-class whites) to criminalize 
the behavior of the powerless (lower class blacks) in order to maintain their position 
of dominance. In essence, the state and its laws are created for the subjugation of 
those who do not have the resources or power to create laws and change their social 
position.  
 Racial threat theory engenders a similar conflict approach but directly 
addresses the interplay of power and race. In his seminal work, Blalock (1967) 
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essentially argues that inter-group competition creates hostility between the dominant 
and minority groups. The dominant white group may initially tolerate a minority 
group in small numbers, but as the minority group grows in size and influence these 
changes create a perceived threat to the dominant group. The effect of this perceived 
threat is the creation and support of policies with a purpose of eradicating this threat 
whether directly or indirectly. 
Laissez-Faire and Colorblind Racism Perspective  
 Bobo and Smith (1998) state, “the underlying racial hierarchy in the U.S has 
not been fundamentally changed” (184). Furthermore, “white-dominated society and 
institutions have never intended full inclusion for blacks and do not show any real 
desire to bring it about” (184).  These authors advance the position of ‘laissez-faire’ 
racism as the new form of racism where “blacks are blamed as the cultural architects 
of their own disadvantaged status” (212) instead of the political, judicial and 
economic structures that have remained relatively unchanged.  
 In Racism without Racists, Bonilla-Silva (2006) prods deeper into the 
transformation of overt racism into a ‘colorblind’ phenomenon. He describes 
colorblind racism as “a racial ideology which propagates the myth that race has all 
but disappeared as a factor shaping the life chances of all Americans” (208). In 
addition, this new form of racism is a “racial ideology which explains contemporary 
racial inequality as the outcome of non-racial dynamics” (2) such as market 
dynamics, naturally occurring phenomenon or cultural limitations. Colorblind racism 
takes a cue from conflict theory in that “ideologies of the powerful are central in the 
production and reinforcement of the status quo” (26) and “aids in the maintenance of 
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white privilege without fanfare” (3). Bonilla-Silva finds that this modern racism 
“thrives off the ugliness of the past” (211) in a reference to Jim Crow laws and 
slavery where blacks were clearly the victims of racist laws, policies, and practices.   
Legal Precedents 
Furman v. Georgia      
When the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial number of cases in which it is 
legally available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable that is it being inflicted 
arbitrarily. Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lottery system. 
 
-Justice Brennan [Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).] 
 
 Starting in the 1970s, the legal system found it impossible to ignore the 
connection between race and the death penalty in a set of important rulings. The 





 amendment’s applicability to capital punishment. The words of 
Justice Brennan summarized the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court which felt strongly 
that capital sentencing procedures were severely flawed in how they were 
administered.  The defendant, William Henry Furman, was a black male of low IQ 
found guilty of killing white homeowner William Micke in a botched home burglary. 
The Supreme Court agreed with Furman when it found that as currently practiced, the 




The important nuance the Court emphasized was that the death penalty itself 
was not unconstitutional but rather the procedures in place to determine who would 
receive this penalty. Addressed by the Court was the fact that juries were given 
unguided discretion in their decision to convict in capital cases. It was found that a 
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lack of standards resulted in the death penalty being applied in an arbitrary and 
capricious fashion, thus making it unconstitutional. Each of the nine justices of the 
Court wrote a separate opinion, making Furman v. Georgia the longest written 
opinion in the Court’s history (Hass and Inciardi, 1988). The controlling majority 
opinion of the Court, or “holding”, was the one quoted above but there were notable 
departures made by concurring Justices Brennan and Marshall. 
During their tenure in the Supreme Court, both Justices voted against the 
death penalty in every single case that came before them (Mello, 1996). Brennan and 
Marshall held a firm belief that capital punishment itself was unconstitutional and 
went against contemporary moral conscience. As Brennan notes, “The State, even as 
it punishes, must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human 
beings. A punishment is "cruel and unusual," therefore, if it does not comport with 
human dignity” (Furman v Georgia, 1972) For these men, law was as a “vehicle for 
advancing common good” and were convinced that “…abolishing the death penalty, 
rather than upholding it, best served the legitimate needs or goals of our society” 
(Mello, 1996:143). While both justices voted in affirmation of striking down the 
death penalty in the Furman case, these insights make clear that their reasons for 
reaching this decision were fundamentally different from the majority.
5
  
                                                
5
 In another concurring opinion, Justice Douglas argued that it was possible for a law to be 
nondiscriminatory on its face but applied in a discriminatory manner thereby violating the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In his finding, the existing state statutes for the death 
penalty in Georgia were “pregnant with discrimination”. As a result, death penalty itself was 
unconstitutional because it was “not compatible with the equal protection of the laws that is implicit in 
the ban on cruel and unusual punishments”. Also with the majority, Justice White focused more on the 
infrequency with which the death penalty was imposed. His main concern was that even for the most 
violent crime, such as murder, there was  “no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in 
which it [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.” Finally, Justice Stewart 
supported the reasoning of the majority by describing the randomness of receiving a death sentence as 
being much like getting struck by lightening. Although he was not convinced that racial discrimination 
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In addition, Marshall ‘s opinion was unique, and most relevant to the current 
study, given that he directly addressed the issue of race. To reiterate, the controlling 
opinion of the Court did not specifically recognize the question of racial disparity in 
capital sentencing but rather the wide range of discretion in recommending the death 
penalty. However, Justice Marshall made a point of centering on race being unjustly 
used as an extra-legal factor in sentencing decisions. When the ruling of the Court 
was conferred in 1972, Furman v. Georgia symbolized the justice systems 
acknowledgement of a ‘dual’ or two-tiered justice system; that is, a system where 
laws were applied differently in similar contexts. When Furman was decided, there 
were about 560 inmates on death row in the country (Melusky and Pesto, 2003). Prior 
to Furman, the Supreme Court had been given some headway when the California 
Supreme Court ruled that under the state’s constitution, the death penalty was “cruel 
and unusual” punishment (California v. Anderson, 1972). 
Theories regarding how the social and political times coalesced in leading to 
the Furman decision could easily form the basis of another study. One reason often 
mentioned is the “heightened awareness” of race discrimination within the justice 
system as a result of the influential civil rights movement (Walker, 1998: 190). The 
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics shows that between 1930 and 1967, more 
than half of those executed were Black. Data also showed that 90 percent of 
individuals executed by the state for rape during this time were Black. Interestingly, 
almost all of those Blacks were from the Southern states (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
1993).  
                                                                                                                                      
had been proven in Furman, he found it impossible to “tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death 
under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.”  
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Indeed, the Furman ruling changed the discourse on capital punishment in a 
profound way. With Furman, the death penalty had been completely taken off the 
table as an option for punishment. Nevertheless, some have been highly critical of the 
Furman ruling given that it failed to center on “race as the elephant in the room” 
(Ogletree, 2006: 63).   Although the federal government did not revise its death 
penalty procedures until 1994, 35 states immediately worked to change (or create if 
they did not previously have them) their procedural directives for handing down a 
capital death sentence (Melusky and Pesto, 2003). The implementation of new 
standards followed one of two models. The North Carolina model was the more 
extreme option in an effort to limit discretion because it called for mandatory death 
sentences for certain types of crimes. On the other hand, the Georgia model had a 
more flexible quality of “guided discretion” (Edelman, 2006:9).  
The Georgia model made a defendant eligible for the death penalty if the 
person was convicted of common-law murder defined as “the unlawful killing with 
malice aforethought”, and if the sentencing jury found at least one of ten possible 
aggravating factors listed in Table 2 (Baldus, et al., 1990).  Another important aspect 
of this model was that it separated a capital trial into two stages. This new bifucurated 
system essentially meant that the guilt phase and sentencing phase of a trial would be 
considered separately although by the same jury (Edelman, 2006).  
During the sentencing phase, juries are offered mitigating factors as evidence 
in reaching a decision and the offender is not limited by the types of mitigating 
factors that can be used. The more typical mitigating factors include: (1) whether or 
not the defendant acted under extreme duress or domination of another person (2) 
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whether at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law 
was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, or the affects of intoxication (3) 
the age of the defendant at the time of the crime (4) whether or not the offense was 
committed under circumstances which the defendant reasonably believed to be a 
moral justification or extenuation for his or her conduct; (5) any other circumstance 
which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the 



















Table 2:   
Georgia Guided Discretion Death Penalty Statute  
 
 
1. the offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed by a person 
with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense of 
murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious 
assaultive criminal convictions; 
 
2. the offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed while 
the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony, or 
aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was committed while the offender 
was engaged in the commission of burglary or arson in the first degree; 
 
3. the offender by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping knowingly 
created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of 
a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than 
one person; 
 
4. the offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for the 
purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value; 
 
5. the murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or 
solicitor or former district attorney or solicitor during or because of the exercise 
of his official duty; 
 
6. the offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder as 
an agent or employee of another person; 
 
7. the offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously or 
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, 
or an aggravated battery to the victim; 
 
8. the offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections 
employee, or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties; 
 
9. the offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from, 
the lawful custody in a place of lawful confinement; and 
 
10. the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or 
preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself 
or another 
 









 A benefit of the bifucurated system found in the Georgia model was that it 
helped to avoid a situation where the accused could incriminate themselves by trying 
to prove their innocence (guilt phase) while simultaneously trying to include 
mitigating circumstances for why they should be given life imprisonment instead of 
death (sentencing phase) if convicted (Crampton v. Ohio, 1970). By creating a system 
where these stages were separated, a jury would be better able to sift through the 
convoluted process of rendering verdicts that were both informed and fair to the 
defendant. 
 Moreover, the Georgia model also sanctioned the addition of an appellate 
review for all capital death sentences (Nakell and Hardy, 1987). This important 
requirement meant that the Georgia Supreme Court would have to look at every 
single death case and decide whether the decision to execute had been made in a 
discriminatory or standard-less fashion. With this automatic appeal process, the 
appellate Court now had a responsibility to “review the record and determine whether 
the evidence supports the jury’s finding of a statutorily designated aggravating 
circumstance” (Baldus, 1990:25). The Court was also expected to determine whether 
the death sentence was excessive and disproportionate when compared to other cases 
of similar quality when it came to the type of crime and the characteristics of the 
defendant (Liebman, 2007). To meet this end, Georgia Supreme Court judges would 
be supplied with a report from the trial judge in the form of a questionnaire. The 
questionnaire would contain six questions that help to disclose whether factors such 
as race played a role in sentencing. 
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 In the aftermath of Furman, we witnessed an almost frenzied effort on the part 
of the states to overhaul their capital sentencing structures. It seemed as though 
legislatures and legal actors alike were all too eager to return to the business of 
execution. Whether or not the Court would accept these revised efforts would be 
determined until four years later. Gregg v. Georgia led the ‘quintet’ of consolidated 
cases that the U.S Supreme Court decided upon on July 2, 1976. Once again, the 
Supreme Court would tackle the constitutionality of the administration of the death 
penalty, but this time its conclusions would be vastly different from that of Furman. 
Gregg v. Georgia was another watershed moment in the history of capital 
punishment. 
 
Gregg v. Georgia 
While some jury discretion still exists, the discretion to be exercised is controlled by 
player and objective standards so as to produce and so far as possible non-
discriminatory application. 
 
-Justice Stewart [Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).] 
 
On November 21, 1973 Troy Gregg murdered and robbed Fred Edward 
Simmons and Bob Durwood Moore in Gwinnett County, Georgia. At his trial, the 
jury found him guilty of two counts of murder and robbery and subsequently 
sentenced him to death for each count (Gregg v. Georgia). In appealing his case, 
Gregg argued that the penalty of death under the Georgia statue was cruel and 










 amendment and that the new Georgia model for capital trials and judicial 
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review sufficiently protected defendants from “arbitrary and capricious” outcomes. In 
other words the general consensus of the Court’s majority was that these new 
regulations ensured that the consideration of extra legal factors (e.g. race) and 
unguided jury discretion would no longer be a problem in capital sentencing. After 
Gregg, many states incorporated the Georgia model into their laws. 
In his separate majority opinion in Gregg, Justice White placed more 
emphasis on the appellate review process in helping him to reach his decision. His 
confidence in these legislative mandates are clear when he stated it can “no longer be 
said that the penalty (of death) is being imposed so wantonly, freakishly and so 
infrequently that it loses its usefulness as a sentencing device. There is therefore a 
reason to expect that Georgia’s current system will escape the infirmities which were 
found to invalidate its previous system under Furman” (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976). 
Not surprisingly, Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented from this majority. 
In his written opinion, Justice Brennan reiterated that the debate over capital 
punishment could not be “explained solely as the result of differences over the 
practical wisdom of a particular government policy” but at its very base, this debate “ 
has been waged on moral grounds” (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976). He further went on to 
say that “foremost among the moral concepts recognized in the cases and inherent in 
the Clause is the primary moral principal that the State, even as it punishes, must treat 
its citizens in a manner consistent with their intrinsic worth as human beings –a 
punishment therefore must not be so severe as to be degrading to human dignity” 
(Gregg v.Georgia, 1976).  
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Similarly, Justice Marshall took the position that the debate over the death 
penalty should not be grounded in how it was applied, but rather whether it should 
ever be used at all. Justice Marshall sidestepped the question of whether the Georgia 
model was constitutional and, instead, focused how unnecessary the death penalty 
was in meeting the goals of deterrence and retribution (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976). In 
his opinion, he declares “the enactment of those statues has no bearing whatsoever on 
the conclusion that the death penalty is unconstitutional because it is excessive” 
(Gregg v. Georgia, 1976). Obviously, judging from the strong statements of the 
Justices, the decision in this case did not come without controversy.  
As previously mentioned, Gregg v. Georgia was one of five cases that the 
Court decided on with regard to the legality of capital sentencing statues. The North 
Carolina model, which became the subject of Woodson v. North Carolina, made the 
death penalty mandatory for anyone convicted of first-degree murder. On June 3, 
1974 James Woodson claimed that he was coerced into participating in the robbery of 
a local convenience store by three of his friends. During the robbery, a customer was 
severely injured and the store clerk was shot dead. Although Woodson was not the 
triggerman, he was convicted of first-degree murder and given an automatic death 
sentence (Woodson v. North Carolina, 1976).  
After appealing his conviction, the Supreme Court in a 5-4 vote found that this 
model was unconstitutional and struck down the mandatory sentence.  There were 
three problems that the Court had with this statute. First, the law “departed from 
contemporary standards” because throughout history the public had always rejected 
mandatory death sentences. Second, the “constitutional deficiency is not eliminated 
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by the mere formal removal of all sentencing power from juries in capital cases” 
(Woodson V. North Carolina, 1976). Essentially, a new problem could arise were 
juries would refuse to convict in certain cases because they may feel that the 
mandatory death penalty is too severe. Third, the North Carolina model did not allow 
for consideration of individual backgrounds given that the 8
th
 amendment speaks to 
the individuality and uniqueness of the worth of every human being (Woodson v. 
North Carolina, 1976). 
Roberts v. Louisiana mirrored that of Woodson V. North Carolina. Stanislaus 
Roberts was convicted of killing the owner of a gas station that he, along with three 
other men, had planned to rob. In this case, his codefendants testified against him for 
the prosecution (Melusky and Pesto, 2003). In Louisiana, the new death penalty 
statue stated that if a jury found that there was intent to kill or inflict “great bodily 
harm” within one of five categories of homicide (one of them being during a robbery) 
then the death penalty would be given automatically (Melusky and Pesto, 2003). 
Capital punishment would be implemented even in a situation where the jury 
recommended mercy. In addition, juries would be instructed on the crimes of second-
degree murder and manslaughter even if none of the evidence in the case would 
suggest that those charges applied. However, if a jury did decide to convict based on 
the latter charges then it would essentially mean that the defendant would be 
acquitted of all greater charges (Roberts v. Louisiana, 1976). 
In a 5-4 vote, the U.S Supreme Court decided that Louisiana’s model was in 
fact unconstitutional and struck it down. The Court’s reasons were similar to those 
presented in Woodson v. North Carolina. Namely, this mandatory statute inhibited the 
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inclusion of mitigating factors as it related to the crime or the individual’s 




 Amendment. Another 
reason why the majority struck down the statute is because it “plainly allows jurors to 
disregard their oaths and choose a verdict for a lesser offense whenever they feel that 
the death penalty is inappropriate” (Woodson v. Louisiana, 1976). 
In contrast to the Woodson and Roberts case, Jurek v. Texas and Proffitt v. 
Florida shared success when the Supreme Court upheld their statutes. In Jurek, the 
defendant was charged with first-degree murder for killing Wendy Adams. The facts 
of the case state “by chocking and strangling her with his bare hands, and by 
drowning her in after throwing her into a river…in the course of committing and 
attempting to commit kidnapping of and forcible rape upon the said victim” (Jurek v. 
Texas, 1976). After his conviction, Jurek appealed the case on the grounds that the 
death penalty was cruel and unusual and that Texas’ sentencing procedure was 
unconstitutional. In a 7-2 vote, the Court rejected both of Jurek’s claims, thus 
accepting the Texas model of capital sentencing. The Court found that the Texas 
statute was admissible because it allowed members of the jury to consider all types of 
mitigating circumstances. Again, it allowed members of the jury to focus on the 
unique context of both the crime and background of the defendant.
6
 
In Proffitt, the defendant “stabbed a sleeping man with a butcher knife while 
burglarizing his home, and while awaiting trial had volunteered to a psychiatrist that 
                                                
6
 The Texas statute required that juries answer three questions: (1) whether the conduct of the 
defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable 
expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result; (2) whether there is a probability 
that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to 
society; and (3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased 
was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased. 
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had had an uncontrollable desire to kill again” (Melusky and Pesto, 2003:109). After 
his conviction, Proffitt appealed on the same grounds as in Jurek. Once again, in a 7-2 
vote, the Supreme Court ruled that the Florida model was acceptable. Florida’s statute 
outlined a two-step process where, if convicted of a capital crime, a jury would return 
an ‘advisory verdict’. Subsequently, the trial judge had the responsibility to decide on 
whether the defendant should receive life imprisonment or death. In reaching a 
decision on sentencing, the statute also outlined the judge’s obligation to submit a 
written explanation of their decision to the Florida Supreme Court as part of the 
automatic review included in this model. In short, the Supreme Court considered 
these safeguards to be sufficient in avoiding ‘arbitrary and capricious’ decisions by 
the lower courts. 
The consolidated cases, lead by Gregg v. Georgia resulted in the 
reinstatement of the death penalty in the U.S. All of these cases touched upon the 
question of arbitrary sentencing. In the opinion of the Court, most of these new statute 
models were able to correct any flaws that could occur with jury discretion.  
It is necessary to state that at the time when Gregg was decided, the Court had 
no empirical data to support whether the procedural forms would actually work in 
eliminating disparity. The Court thought that these new legal procedures might work 
but they had nothing to substantiate this claim. In his opinion, Justice Stewart implied 
that the Court did not have solid affirmation that procedural reform would work when 
he said “on their face, these procedures seem to satisfy the concern of Furman”
7
 
However the issue of race still had not been directly addressed by the Court. Furman 
                                                
7
 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976 
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was the closest that the Supreme Court had come to recognizing the possibility of 
racial disparity but Gregg had swept such issues back under the rug and renewed the 
optimism that the legal system could remedy itself. Over a decade later, the Supreme 
Court would have no choice but to take on the question of racial disparity and 
inconsistent application of the death penalty. 
McClesky v. Kemp 
 But the inherent lack of predictability of jury decisions does not justify their 
condemnation. On the contrary, it is the jury’s function to make the difficult and 
uniquely human judgments that defy codification… 
 
-Justice Powell [McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).] 
Warren McCleskey was found guilty on two counts of robbery and one count 
of murder in the death of a white police officer in Fulton County, Georgia. In 
appealing his conviction, McCleskey argued that his death sentence was 
unconstitutional because it was “administered in a racially discriminatory manner” 




 amendments (McCleskey v. Kemp, 1987). In 
order to prove his claim, McCleskey referred to a study conducted by Professor David 
Baldus and colleagues which revealed after controlling for hundreds of case 
characteristics, the odds of a death sentence for those who kill white victims in 
Georgia were on average 4.3 times higher than for those who killed non-white victims 
(Baldus et al., 1990). In using empirical research, McCleskey made the bold 
statement that he was unfairly targeted by the justice system to receive the death 
penalty simply because his victim had been a white person. 
 McCleskey was unique because it brought to the fore the idea that the 
widespread usage of extra-legal factors in capital sentencing was empirically 
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supported and should thus be recognized by the courts. McCleskey suggested that 
these empirical findings should invalidate the death sentences of all similar cases in 
the state of Georgia. In a 5-4 vote, the Court rejected the arguments set forth by the 
petitioner.  
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell made clear that in presiding over 
these types of cases, their “analysis begins with the basic principle that a defendant 
who alleges an equal protection violation has the burden of proving ‘the existence of 
purposeful discrimination’” (McCleskey v. Kemp, 1987). The Court rejected the 
results of the Baldus Study finding that “such general statistical evidence about the 
operation of Georgia’s capital sentencing system cannot be the basis for an inference 
that McCleskey himself was deliberately discriminated against” (Paternoster, Brame 
and Bacon, 2008:210). In the eyes of the Court, it was not enough for the petitioner to 
highlight trends of racial disparity and then make the assumption that it automatically 
applied to his or her case. If McCleskey were to have any semblance of success in his 
arguments he would have to “demonstrate that the prosecutors, judges and jurors in 
his particular case had an intent to discriminate and acted on that intent (Paternoster, 
Brame and Bacon, 2008:210). 
Furthermore, Justice Powell argued that while there may be a risk of racial 
injustice there are also other kinds of prejudice that are just as likely if not more so. 
For example, other unexplained disparities could relate to such things as the gender of 
the defendant, gender of the courtroom actors, or physical attractiveness of the 
defendant or victim (McCleskey v. Kemp, 1987). The concern that the majority 
articulated in their response was that if McCleskey’s claims, based on statistics, were 
 
 31 
allowed by the Court it would leave the door open for all types of claims of general 
correlation rather than clear and direct causal evidence. One could extend this 
argument to possibly conclude that all people that commit crime would then try to use 
the latest research and paint themselves as victims of the justice system rather than 
take responsibility for their criminal behavior. Finally, the majority made the 
suggestion that if there was some credence to the McCleskey claims based on the 
Baldus Study evidence then the proper place for it to be considered should be the 
state legislatures (McCleskey v. Kemp, 1987). 
Justice Brennan implored that while McCleskey was unable to prove that race 
was an extra legal factor used in his specific case, it should not matter.  In Justice 
Brennan’s opinion, he noted that Furman made it clear that the Court was most 
concerned with “the risk of the imposition of an arbitrary sentence, rather than the 
proven fact of one” (McCleskey v. Kemp, 1987). In other words, the fact that 
McCleskey was able to show a general trend of the influence of race in Georgia 
should have been enough to raise the alarm that the risk of sentencing an offender to 
death because of race was too great. Furthermore, Justice Brennan found that 
“…concern for arbitrariness focuses on the rationality of the system as a whole and 
the fact that a system that features a significant probability that sentencing decisions 
are influenced by impermissible considerations cannot be regarded as rational” 
(McCleskey v. Kemp, 1987).  
Some have stated that the ruling in McCleskey  essentially acted as an 
“obstacle to progress” (Amnesty International Report, 2003: 4). For example, South 
Carolina murder defendant, Earl Matthews, presented evidence showing that the 
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prosecutor in the county where he was convicted discriminated against him. In all of 
the cases in which the prosecutor had sought death, all victims had been white. In 
addition, testimony given by former employees of the prosecutor evidenced the 
prosecutor’s racial prejudices. Despite these factors that seemed to point to prejudice, 
Matthews’ death sentence was not struck down (Paternoster, Brame and Bacon, 2008) 
Similar to Matthews, in another South Carolina capital case, Raymond 
Patterson presented statistical evidence to show that the prosecutor’s office in the 
county where he had been convicted also displayed racial discrimination. In that 
county, although there had been 174 murders involving black victims since 1977, the 
prosecutor had not sought a single death sentence in a black victim’s case. In 
addition, Patterson’s lawyers argued that the prosecutor had used multiple pre-
emptive strikes to secure an all-white jury (Paternoster, Brame and Bacon, 2008).  
Since the McCleskey ruling in 1987 these few defendants have tried to use 
statistical proof but all have failed. McCleskey remains the most current position that 
the Court has taken on race and capital sentencing. The next section will offer a 
review of the more pertinent research studies relating to race and capital sentencing. 
In addition, the next section will discuss the role of the prosecutor and what research 






Chapter 3: Literature Review 
 
 
Race and the Death Penalty 
 
As of January 1, 2009 there are over 3, 297 people in state and federal 
facilities waiting to be executed (Death Penalty Information Center). While whites 
remain the majority on death row, similar to general crime trends, blacks are 
disproportionately represented on death row compared to their percentage in the 
population of just over 12% (Allan and Clubb, 2008). Interestingly, when looking at 
the death row populations for all regions in the 2000 U.S Census (New England, Mid-
Atlantic, East North Central, South, Border, West North Central, Mountain, Pacific) 
blacks are the only racial category consistently over-represented (Allan and Clubb, 
2008:Table 8.1). Figure 2 offers a current breakdown of the racial makeup of death 
row. 
As discussed in the past section, these updated trends merely reflect what has 
been a fact since capital punishment was instituted. In the 19
th
 century, several states 
had created laws where the death penalty applied only if the offender was black thus 
making it unsurprising that black would be disproportionately represented on death 





 Johnson (1941) is the earliest known study to look at race and capital 
sentencing. In The Negro and Crime, he attributes the struggles of the black 
community to a history of intolerance and a “continuous vicious cycle of caste 
barriers” (p.94). He makes the argument that the murder of a white person by a black 
offender is not viewed as morally equal to the murder of a black person by someone 
of the same race. In his study, Johnson collected data on murder cases during the 
1930s in several counties of North Carolina, Virginia and Georgia. In analyzing the 
four racial combinations, he found that killers of white victims were more likely to 
get both life imprisonment and the death penalty while black offenders that killed 
white victims were executed at higher rates than any other combination. 
 A few years later, another study also looked at trends from the 1930s and 
found similar results as Johnson. Garfinkel (1949) studied ten different counties in 
Figure 2 
U.S Death Row Inmates By Race  (As of January 1, 2009) 
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North Carolina and analyzed 673 homicide cases. Not only did he find that the 
majority of homicides were intraracial, he also discovered that whenever there was 
interracial violence involving a black offender that individual had a higher likelihood 
of receiving a death conviction. 
 With the advent of the 1960s, race issues were at the center point of American 
democratic debate. Equal protection and rights under the law was the mantra of many 
grassroots and community advocates. At this time, another important research study 
looked at the state of Texas and its experience with race and capital sentencing. In 
this investigation, however, Koeninger (1969) looked at disparity from a slightly 
different perspective. His key question was whether race made a difference when it 
came to death sentences that were commuted. In looking at data from 1924 to 1968, 
he found that blacks convicted and sentenced to death had their cases commuted in 
16% of the cases whereas whites convicted and sentenced in similar cases had their 
death sentence commuted 26% of the time.   
While the vast majority of studies in the 1960s and earlier all seemed to point 
to the influence of race in capital sentencing, some did not share those conclusions. 
For example, Judson et al. (1969) used a sample of 238 first-degree capital murder 
cases in California between 1958 and 1966. They collected data on the cases using 
questionnaires that were sent out to the California Department of Corrections and also 
sent them out to the judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys for each of the cases 
(p.1310). They found that “Juries administered the system extremely satisfactorily in 
the race area. Once the effects of other aspects of the case were removed, the 
defendant’s or victim’s race had no effect on the penalty variable” (1421). The 
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researchers then concluded that based on their results, they were convinced that 
“California clearly appears not to be unconstitutional on racial bias grounds” (1421).  
In 1973, the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
published a special volume entitled ‘Blacks and the Law’. In it, two researchers 
revealed the results from a groundbreaking study that looked at rape convictions and 
executions in eleven states, including Georgia. Data was collected over a twenty-year 
period (1945-1965) and in over 230 counties combined. The findings indicated that 
while death sentences for the crime of rape had drastically declined, rape cases that 
involved a black perpetrator and white victim had not (Wolfgang and Reidel, 1973). 
Overall, it was revealed that black men accused of raping white women were 
approximately 18 times more likely to get a death sentences than if a white or black 
man had raped a black women (Wolfgang and Reidel, 1973).  
This study, given its statistical rigor and wide acceptance in criminological 
research circles, was one of the first to play a substantial role in a Supreme Court 
case. The findings were entered as evidence in Maxwell v Bishop (1970) in the 
petitioner’s attempt to show why their conviction had been racially motivated. In the 
end, the statistical evidence was rejected as grounds for a stay of the death sentence 
(Maxwell v. Bishop, 1970). The court rejected the evidence for two reasons: (1) the 
petitioner only presented general statistical evidence about discrimination and not 
evidence that he had personally been the victim of racial prejudice (2) the study was 
incomplete because it did not consider all relevant legal variables, did not include 
counties from all over the state, and did not include data from the county that tried 
and convicted Maxwell (Paternoster, Brame and Bacon, 2008). 
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A few years later, Zimring and colleagues (1976) examined 204 homicide 
cases in Philadelphia and ultimately found that 65% of those who killed a white 
person received death or a life sentence while only 25% of those whole killed a black 
person received either of those sentences. Bienen and colleagues (1988) looked at 
capital sentencing in New Jersey and reviewed 404 cases. It was found that a person 
who killed a white victim would be 10 times more likely to face the death penalty 
than if the victim were Hispanic or Black. However, if the offender was Black or 
Hispanic and had killed a white victim, they were twice more likely to be charged 
with a capital offense.  
As the past discussion on legal precedents highlights, the early 1970s saw a 
shift in the capital punishment discourse with the rulings in Furman and Gregg. 
Research responded in turn to now look at how disparities could have been impacted 
by these critical changes in law. Bowers and Pierce (1980) recognized the importance 
of earlier stages in the criminal process. In their study, they analyzed data from 
Florida between 1973 and 1977 where they found that “black offenders that killed 
white victims were more than twice as likely to be indicted for first degree murder 
(thus making them eligible for the death penalty) compared to black offenders who 
killed black victims. Other studies that focus on the indictment stage also found 
similar results (Radelet, 1981; Bowers, 1983; Radelet and Pierce, 1985; Paternoster, 
1983; Paternoster, 1984; Paternoster and Kazyaka 1988). Other researches have 
looked at the success of capital sentence appeals and race (Radelet and Vandiver, 
1983). Still others have taken an interest in looking at the actual proportion of people 
killed by the state and its racial implications (Kleck, 1981). 
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The post-Furman research has displayed some interesting findings. For 
example, Riedel (1976) sought to compare sentencing outcomes across U.S states 
before and after Furman. They used two data sets and were provided with a list of all 
offenders that were given the death penalty by the NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund. The final sample consisted of 407 offenders in twenty-eight states.  
The other set of data came from the National Prison Statistics (NPS). Riedel found 
there were actually a higher number of non-whites sentenced to death after Furman 
than before. This was particularly striking given that this major Supreme Court ruling 
was supposed to address disparate sentencing procedure rather than make it worse. 
Ziesel (1981) conducted a study of prisoners on death row in Florida. He 
observed that after Furman the percentage of people on death row that had killed 
blacks rose and the percentage of black offenders on death row dropped. Reverse 
discrimination prompted by Furman in an effort to “balance” the capital sentencing 
system has been offered as a potential reason for this result (Lester, 1998).  
The above two studies are a good example of how the data on race and capital 
sentencing have been telling many different stories.  It is important to point out that 
the studies have all focused on different stages in the capital sentencing process. 
Some have looked only at death row populations, others at the rate of executions, still 
others the decision to seek death by a jury or judge. Moreover, astute researchers have 
made it clear that it is a dangerous assumption to automatically link racial disparity to 
a process of racial discrimination (Paternoster, Brame and Bacon, 2008).   
To date, the study conducted by Baldus, Woodworth and Pulaski (1990) is the 
most well-known and comprehensive investigation to rigorously test whether racial 
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discrimination is fact or fiction. While the raw data suggests that racial disparity 
exists, to conclude that this disparity was as a result of a racist death penalty system 
required more proof. The purpose of the Baldus Study was to address what became 
known as the Impossibility Hypotheses. 
The first hypothesis, formulated by Supreme Court Justice Harlan in 1971 
“questions whether trial-level reforms, particularly the use of standards and 
guidelines to channel the exercise of jury discretion, can distinguish rationally 
between those who should live and those who should die” (Baldus et al., 1990: 2) The 
second hypothesis “questions the ability of state supreme courts to provide the 
oversight of their death-sentencing systems required to ensure that they operate in a 
consistent, nondiscriminatory fashion” (Baldus et al., 1990: 2).  
In the aftermath of Furman and Gregg there was some doubt as to whether 
procedural changes in statutes could truly remedy the underlying problem of 
arbitrariness and disparity. Data used in the analysis were from the Procedural 
Reform Study (1970-1978) and Charging and Sentencing Study (1973-1979) 
somewhat overlapped. The first study (N=156) was predominantly used to test the 
second impossibility hypothesis and the second study (N=594) was primarily used to 
test the first impossibility hypothesis (Baldus et al., 1990). Together, they are 
considered as one study even thought the results from the Charging and Sentencing 
Study dominated the discussion in McCleskey. The Baldus Study controlled for over 
400 variables and the main logistic regression model had 39 predictor variables.  
The general findings were that after Furman, there was (controlling for 
aggravating factors and other legally relevant variables) a “statewide decline in the 
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race of defendant effect” (Baldus, et.al., 1990:182). However, they noticed that race 
of victim had significant explanatory power and persisted in the post-Furman era, 
especially in rural areas. Another important finding was that racial disparity was most 
dramatic for the ‘middle of the road’ capital cases. That is, capital cases that exhibited 
neither the most aggravating nor the least aggravating factors.  
The Baldus Study rejected commonly held views about the factors that go into 
deciding death sentences. The emergence of the race of victim as paramount in death 
sentencing and race of defendant as irrelevant was unique compared to all other past 
work in this area. The resilience of race seemed undeniable however it now appeared 
to be manifesting itself in a new way. The covert discriminatory effects of victim race 
had now replaced the overt discriminatory effect of offender race. Instead of a death 
penalty system that seemed to directly target black offenders, the Baldus Study 
suggested a fundamental shift toward targeting anyone that killed white victims. In 
this way, discrimination and prejudice still persisted but in a more subtle fashion. 
In 1998, Baldus and colleagues conducted another study that looked at race 
disparity in Philadelphia. They collected data from the Administrative Office of 
Pennsylvania Courts and the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County and 
garnered nearly 700 homicide cases (Baldus et al, 1998). The interesting finding in 
this study, in contrast to the earlier study in Georgia, was that both the race of 
defendant and a race of victim had an effect on the probability of receiving a death 
sentence. With all the work that had now been done in the area of race and capital 
sentencing, the U.S General Accounting Office conducted a meta-analysis of 28 
studies. It found that in 82% of the studies, those who murdered whites were more 
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likely to get the death penalty. More importantly, “legally relevant variables, such as 
aggravating circumstances, were influential but did not help to explain fully the racial 
disparities researchers found” (GAO, 1990:6). 
While the Garfinkel (1949) and Johnson (1941) studies in North Carolina 
provided us with some of our first real research on issue of race, a 2001 study was 
able to offer new insight into whether race effects in North Carolina had changed. In 
reviewing capital sentences between 1993-1997, Unah and Boger (2001) reviewd 502 
death eligible cases and controlled for 113 potential factors. Their results suggested 
that not much had changed in North Carolina given that the odds of receiving the 
death penalty rose 3.5 times if a defendant murdered a white person. 
Paternoster et al (2004) looked at the state of Maryland’s track record on 
death sentencing and primarily the prosecutor’s charging decision. The homicide data 
used spanned from 1978-1999. The researchers screened about 6,000 first and 
second-degree murders in the state and then meticulously went through each case to 
see if they were in fact “death eligible”. In the end, they concluded “the probability of 
being sentenced to death was about twice as high for those who killed white victims 
as for those who killed a black” (Paternoster, Brame, and Bacon, 2008:206). In 
addition, the place where the crime was committed also seemed to increase the 
likelihood that one would be given a death sentence. 
Pierce and Radelet (2005) analyzed California data between the years 1990-
1999. Using a sample of 263 cases, the researchers found “defendants convicted of 
killing non-Hispanic white victims receive the death penalty at a rate of 1.75 per 100 
victims compared to the rate of 0.47 for defendants convicted of killing non-Hispanic 
 
 42 
Blacks” (Pierce and Radelet, 2005:19). They also noted “if we compare death 
sentencing rates for those who kill non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic Blacks 
strong differences persist even across different levels of aggravation” (p.24). 
For Colorado, Hinden, Potter and Radeley (2006) identified two overlapping 
sets of cases: (1) cases where a defendant that was sentenced to death in Colorado 
between 1972-2005 (2) cases where the death penalty was sought from 1980-1999. 
The researchers were able to come up with 110 cases for their study. Using 
newspaper articles, published decisions by appellate courts, interviews with attorneys 
and information from the Colorado Department of Corrections, they were able to 
collect details about each case. In the end, it was found that those who killed a white 
victim were four times more likely to get a death sentence than if they had killed a 
black person. In addition, they also looked at gender and found that the highest 
probability of receiving the death penalty could be attained if a white female was 
killed. 
In a 2008 study of Tennessee, researchers used data comprised of 986 first-
degree murder cases ranging from years 1977 to 2006. They controlled for such 
variables as the cause of death (e.g. stabbing shooting) , motive, location of homicide, 
and offender criminal history. The study evaluated two decision-making points in 
capital sentencing: (1) prosecutorial decision to pursue the death penalty (2) jury 
decision to deliver a death sentence. It was found that “if there is racial discrimination 
with respect to victims, it occurs more in the prosecutorial office than at the jury 
stage” (Scheb, et al., 2008).  
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According to the study, blacks accused of killing black victims were just as 
likely, if not slightly more likely, to be sentenced to death than blacks that killed 
whites. The same was true when looking at white defendants. However, when blacks 
killed black victims, prosecutors would seek death 25% of the time but the number 
increased to 39% if the victim were white. Likewise, prosecutors sought death when 
the defendant was white and victim was black 24% of the time but if the victim were 
white in this scenario the rate increased to 40% (Scheb, et al., 2008). It is important to 
note that greater disparity appeared when looking at the prosecutor’s decision to seek 
death after conviction compared to the stage where the court finally decided 
punishment. The wide discretion available to the prosecutor leaves much room for 
arbitrary choices in case processing and opportunity for prejudicial views to seep 
through. 
The actors within the criminal justice system are central figures to how crime 
and criminal behavior are defined and how laws are enforced. Sentencing a person to 
death comes as a result of a number of decision-making points by individual actors. 
Learning about how these individuals process defendants through the justice funnel 
brings us a step closer to revealing how disparities, especially by race, come about. In 
the next section, we look at the role of the prosecutor and what research says about 
the factors that guide their decisions. 
Prosecutorial Decision Making 
A prosecutor is an elected or appointed attorney whose role is to “advocate for 
the public in felony cases and in a variety of generally less serious offenses” (Perry, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Report, 2006). The authority afforded to a prosecutor’s 
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office can vary depending on the jurisdiction and therefore should not be understood 
as fixed. In some places prosecutors control the initial charging decision while in 
other places they merely rubber stamp the charging decision of the police department. 
Some prosecutors do extensive investigation and police work for each criminal case 
while others may rely wholly on law enforcement (Williams, 1976). Table 3 lists the 
official duties of the Attorney General for the state of Georgia. 
Overtime, the role of the prosecutor has emerged as central within the 
criminal justice system (Forst, 2002). Prosecutors are powerful because their job 
gives them an inordinate amount of discretion in decision-making. Kingsnorth et al. 
(2002) define this discretion as “the authority to choose among a variety of 
procedural alternatives in pursuit of case resolution” (553). Prosecutorial discretion is 
displayed in the following three ways: (1) the circumstances under which a criminal 
charge will be filed (2) the level at which an alleged offender will be charged and (3) 
when to discontinue prosecution (Albonetti and Hepburn, 1996). When it comes to 
capital cases, a prosecutor’s discretion also includes making a decision on whether 
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 In Georgia, crimes that could be charged as capital offenses are: murder, kidnapping with bodily 
injury or ransom when the victim dies; aircraft hijacking; treason. (Capital Punishment 2007, Bureau 





 State of Georgia Attorney General Official Duties 
 
The Attorney General is given authority and obligations by the Georgia Constitution and the 
Official Code of Georgia. Duties include: 
• Serving as the attorney and legal advisor for all state agencies, departments, authorities and 
the Governor. 
• Providing opinions on legal questions concerning the State of Georgia or its agencies, 
which are binding on all state agencies and departments. 
• Representing the State of Georgia in all capital felony appeals before the Supreme Court of 
Georgia. 
• Representing the State of Georgia in all civil cases before any court. 
• Representing the State of Georgia in all cases appearing before the Supreme Court of the 
United States. The 
• Prosecuting public corruption cases where criminal charges are filed against any person or 
business for illegal activity when dealing with the State of Georgia. 
• Conducting special investigations into questionable activity concerning any state agency or 
department or a person or business that has done business with the State of Georgia. 
• Initiating civil or criminal actions on behalf of the State of Georgia when requested to do 
so by the Governor. 
• Preparing all contracts and agreements regarding any matter in which the State of Georgia 
is involved. 
 
The Attorney General does not, and indeed by law cannot, provide legal advice to private 
citizens. 
Source: Adapted from the official website, Attorney General for the State of Georgia, 
http://law.ga.gov/02/ago/home/0,2705,87670814,00.html 
 
Misner (1996) offers three reasons that explain why prosecutorial discretion has 
increased over the decades: 
(1) Criminal law has so many overlapping and complicated provisions that it is 
now left to the legal expertise of the prosecutor to determine whether to 
characterize conduct as criminal and which provisions to apply based on the 
circumstance. 
(2) Our oversaturated legal system is highly dependant upon plea-bargaining 
because there are not be enough resources or time to take every potential 
criminal case to trial. 
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(3) The development of sentencing guidelines and growth of statutes with 
mandatory minimums has increased the importance of the charging decision 
by the prosecutor since this decision determines the range of sentences 
available to the court. 
Prosecutors do not have specific rules or guidelines that they are expected to 
follow in making their case selection decisions (Misner, 1996; Spohn and Holleran, 
2004). The autonomy and power of the prosecutor is difficult to ignore especially 
since their decisions can dictate the outcome of a criminal case. The decision to seek 
the death penalty is the most critical that a prosecutor will ever make given the 
irreversible outcome.  
 Albonetti (1991) describes the theory of “uncertainty avoidance” in decision- 
making. Rational choice models assume that the actor has knowledge of all available 
options but in reality this is rarely the case. In most situations, the justice actor (such 
as the prosecutor) has incomplete knowledge of all facets of the case before them. 
The author suggests that when decision-makers within the justice system are placed in 
this predicament, they rely upon rationality that is “the product of habit and social 
structure” (Albonetti, 1991: 249).  
What this essentially tells us is that decision making, rather than being a purely 
objective process, is usually tainted with the individual’s predilections. While 
incomplete knowledge is an unavoidable aspect of the criminal process, it presents 
the problem of not immediately being clear on, for example, a prosecutor’s motives in 
making different choices in two cases that appear to be similar. In a worst-case 
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scenario, these situations may allow an actor’s negative biases to guide how they 
undertake their responsibilities. 
Few researchers have examined the influence of offender or victim 
characteristics on the prosecutor. Most attempts made to get at this ‘black box’ of 
decision-making were conducted in the 1980s and only a handful of more recent work 
has taken a look at this issue. On the prosecutor’s decision to reduce charges, older 
studies suggest a particularly strong influence of seriousness of offense and prior 
record (McDonald, 1985; Meyer & Gray, 1997). Past studies have also indicated that 
offender characteristics such as gender, age and race matter in criminal charge 
reduction (Albonetti, 1992; Bernstein, Kick, Leung, & Schulz, 1977; Farnworth & 
Teske, 1995; Figueira-McDonough, 1985; Miethe & Moore, 1986). For example, 
Bernstein et al.,  (1977) found white defendants more likely to receive favorable 
charge reductions compared to black defendants. Albonetti (1992) showed younger 
males were less likely to receive reduced charges when compared to older defendants 
and female defendants. Farnworth and Teske (1995) revealed that young, Black men 
were less likely to have their initial charges reduced by the prosecutor compared to all 
other defendants. 
Ball (2006) examined the disparate treatment of particular defendants in count 
bargaining decisions. The author found that defendant characteristics (such as race 
and age) had no significant influence on the prosecutor however the legally relevant 
variables (such as the offenders prior felonies and seriousness of the current charge) 
were significant. Wooldredge and Griffin (2005) examined Ohio’s sentencing reform, 
which resulted in significant increases in prosecutorial discretion. In looking at race, 
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they found that overall levels of charge reduction increased, however, no particular 
racial and/or gender group benefited from this more than another. 
Spears and Spohn (1997) looked at the influence of victim characteristics on 
the prosecutor’s charging decisions when it came to rape cases. They found that 
strength of evidence was not significant. The relevant factors were the prosecutor’s 
impression of the victim’s moral character, victim behavior at the time of the sexual 
assault and if the victim was a teenager or adult. They did not find race of victim 
effects. Frenzel and Ball (2007) used data collected by the Pennsylvania Commission 
on Sentencing which reflected all felonies and misdemeanors in 1998. Their main 
dependent variable was case disposition. Essentially, their goal was to determine if 
race predicted negotiated plea deals with the prosecutor compared to going to trial. 
They eventually found that white offenders were more likely to be able to strike a 
plea deal with a prosecutor compared to black offenders who were more likely to 
have their case go to trial. 
In states with mandatory minimums in their sentencing laws, the role of the 
prosecutor becomes even more important. In these states, Ulmer et al (2007) 
describes the prosecutor as having “pure” discretion over sentencing outcomes (427). 
In their study, the researchers conducted a multi-level analysis to determine the 
circumstances where a prosecutor would apply a mandatory minimum for drug 
crimes. They did not find a significant race effect for Black defendants but did find 
“Hispanics offenders have almost twice the odds of receiving mandatory minimums 
compared to white offenders” (442). 
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With regard to death penalty decisions and the prosecutor, even less literature 
has been produced within the field. Sorenson and Wallace (1999) examined pre-trial 
decisions made by prosecutors to determine whether they were influenced by race. 
They used data from a Midwest county and looked at all potential capital cases from 
1991 to 1996. After controlling for legally relevant considerations, they found that 
homicide cases where a black defendant had killed a white victim were more likely 
(compared to all other racial combination) to have a prosecutor pursue first-degree 
murder charges, be served with a notice of aggravating circumstances and 
subsequently proceed to a capital murder trial. 
 Free (2002) conducted a meta-analysis of prosecutors’ charging decisions in 24 
studies. Of the 24, he found that 15 had no significant race effects on charging 
decisions but noted that other social status factors such as gender and age sometimes 
influence these decisions. He also made an attempt to assess 19 death penalty studies 
and ultimately drew the conclusion that race determined whether prosecutors sought 
the death penalty. However, in taking a closer look at his chosen studies, it is clear 
that he does not select studies with consistent dependent outcomes. In other words, 
decisions of other actors such as judges and juries are also included. This overlap 
makes it difficult to take this meta-analysis at face value. There are simply not 
enough studies to produce definite results about the prosecutor and decisions in 
capital cases. 
 Overall, the literature on prosecutorial decision-making appears to show 
mixed results. In some situations, prosecutors are heavily influence by legal factors 
while in others race, age and gender seem to matter more.  
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The relevance of the prosecutor in the processing of a criminal case cannot be 
overstated which is why the prosecutor’s decision to seek the death penalty is central 
to the current investigation. With capital sentencing, the prosecutor does not reveal 
why they may choose to seek death in one case compared to another, which makes 
this stage in sentencing somewhat secretive. This ‘black box’ of case processing 
makes it more difficult to understand why there is sentencing disparity among various 
demographics. As a result, research is necessary to figure out if disparity in capital 
cases is based on legitimate factors or if there are other variables, such as race, that 
contribute to a prosecutor’s decision to seek death. 
The current study continues in a similar line of investigation as past research. 
The results may help to make an appropriate judgment on whether the magnitude of 
race effects (specifically, race of victim) has stayed the same or if this new ‘post-
racial’ America (where race is supposedly an irrelevant feature) is reflected in 
Georgia’s legal system. More importantly, it will be interesting to test the assertion by 
the Scheb et al. (2008) that the prosecutor’s office is likely to perpetuate racist 
practices. 
Georgia led the way in changing its legal procedures for administering capital 
punishment. The Gregg ruling recognized this advancement by reinstituting capital 
punishment in 1976. To reiterate, the Baldus Study on Georgia looked at data in the 
1970s and was able to draw important conclusions about the importance of race in the 
death penalty system. However, an important legal argument could be made that the 
new legislation did not have time to set it in and actually have an impact in removing 
 
 51 
disparity. The Court seemed confident that race and justice would dramatically 






Chapter 4: Research and Methods 
Data 
  The dataset was obtained from the Atlanta Journal-Constitution that 
researched 2, 328 murder convictions in the state of Georgia ranging from January 1, 
1995 to December 31, 2004. The main sources used to uncover these cases were court 
and prison records. In addition, information on case specifics were gleaned from such 
sources as medical examiner reports, search and arrest warrants, police reports and 
Georgia Supreme Court decisions. After these steps were taken, some cases still had 
incomplete information and so the newspaper also interviewed local district attorneys, 
judges and other law enforcement officials in order to obtain complete records.  
The sample of interest is death-eligible murder convictions (i.e. capital cases). 
As noted in the previous section, at least one of the ten legislated aggravators is 
required before a homicide case can be tried as a capital case in Georgia. Of the cases 
that were deemed death eligible in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution data, a portion 
was excluded from the final sample. These excluded cases were comprised of 
murderers that had pleaded guilty but were deemed mentally ill
9
, cases where 
children below the age of 17 committed the murder and, finally, convictions that were 
overturned on appeal unless the defendant was convicted again within the decade 
examined by the newspaper. After excluding all cases that would not have been 
                                                
9
Well before the U.S Supreme Court addressed the question of executing the mentally insane (Ford v. 
Wainright, 477 U.S 399 [1986] and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S 304 [2002]), Georgia was the first 
state to ban executing the mentally retarded through a state statute (Ga.Code. Ann. Sect 17-7-131(i). 
However, it remains a requirement that defendants prove mental deficiency beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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considered death eligible due to special circumstances, the new sample size was 1317 
(Atlanta Journal Constitution, 2008). 
 Within the sample of death eligible cases, the data included the categories of 
African-American, Caucasian, American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian or Pacific 
Islander and Hispanic. Victims that were neither black nor white were excluded from 
this study because of the extremely small number of these alternative groups present 
in the sample. Defendants that were neither black nor white were excluded from the 





(1): The murder of a white victim (irrespective of the race of defendant) will be 
positively and significantly related to whether a prosecutor will seek the death 
penalty. 
(2) The murder of a white victim by a black offender should generate the highest odds 
that a prosecutor will seek the death penalty compared to all other racial 
combinations. 
(3): The murder of a black victim by a black offender should generate the lowest odds 
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 Due to their small number, 22 cases of racial/ethnic groups other than white or black were 




 In order to test the hypothesis of whether race of victim and offender/victim 
race combinations are relevant to a prosecutor’s decision to seek the death penalty, 
the multivariate logistic regression method of analysis is used. The decision to use 
this statistical method was based upon the nature of the research question. The 
dependent variable is dichotomous (1=yes, the prosecutor will seek death and 0=no, 
the prosecutor will not seek death) and so this method was appropriate. The benefits 
of this approach are three-fold. First, it is helpful in calculating the probability of 
success over the probability of failure give that the results of the analysis are in the 
form of an odds ratio. Second, logistic regression also provides knowledge of the 
relationships and strengths among the variables. With odds ratios, a number greater 
than 1 signifies a positive relationship while a number less than 1 signifies an inverse 
(or negative relationship).   Third, this approach is commonly used and well 
understood by researchers in the field. A disadvantage to this approach is that it 
makes the assumption that variables that could be relevant to a predicted outcome 
have not been omitted from the model (Paternoster and Brame, 2008). 
 The logistic regression analysis was broken up into six models. The key 
dependent outcome for each model was whether the prosecutor sought the death 
penalty. Model 1 included only the victim race and controls. Model 2 looked at the 
impact of a white offender killing a black victim along with the controls. Model 3 
included analysis of white offenders killing white victims. Model 4 included the 
variable for black offenders killing black victims. Model 5 included the variable for 
black offenders killing white victims. Finally, model 6 included all the offender/victim 
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racial combinations except for the black defendant kills a black victim variable. I used 
black kills black as a reference category because of my assumption that these kinds of 
cases would receive the lowest likelihood of a prosecutor seeking death.  
Models 
The six models are as follows: 
ln (deathsought)= B1 + B2whitevictim + B3Vicsex + B4confession + B5multiplevictim 
+ B6AgF1...+ B13AgF10 + B14priorcon + B15sexrel + B16drugrel + B17alcorel + 
B18offsex + B19urban + B20stranger + B21offage + !                                 
                              (1) 
ln (deathsought)= B1 + B2whitekillsblack + B3Vicsex + B4confession + 
B5multiplevictim + B6AgF1...+ B13AgF10 + B14priorcon + B15sexrel + B16drugrel + 
B17alcorel + B18offsex + B19urban + B20stranger + B21offage + !                                 
                              (2) 
ln (deathsought)= B1 + B2whitekillswhite + B3Vicsex + B4confession + 
B5multiplevictim + B6AgF1...+ B13AgF10 + B14priorcon + B15sexrel + B16drugrel + 
B17alcorel + B18offsex + B19urban + B20stranger + B21offage + !                                 
                              (3) 
ln (deathsought)= B1 + B2blackkillsblack + B3Vicsex + B4confession + 
B5multiplevictim + B6AgF1...+ B13AgF10 + B14priorcon + B15sexrel + B16drugrel + 
B17alcorel +B18offsex + B19urban + B20stranger + B21offage +!                                 
                              (4) 
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ln (deathsought)= B1 + B2blackkillswhite + B3Vicsex + B4confession + 
B5multiplevictim + B6AgF1...+ B13AgF10 + B14priorcon + B15sexrel + B16drugrel + 
B17alcorel + B18offsex + B19urban + B20stranger + B21offage+ !                                 
                              (5) 
ln (deathsought)= B1 + B2blackkillswhite + B3whitekillsblack + B4whitekillswhite + 
B5Vicsex + B6confession + B7multiplevictim + B8AgF1...+ B15AgF10 + B16priorcon 
+ B17sexrel + B18drugrel + B19alcorel + B20offsex + B21urban + B22stranger + 
B23offage !                  
                              (6) 
Dependent 
The key outcome of interest was the prosecutor’s decision to seek the death 
penalty. As a dichotomous variable, the dependent deathsought outcome had two 
possible outcomes:1= yes, the prosecutor sought death and 0= no, the prosecutor did 
not seek death. From Table 5 you can see that there were 653 cases where the victim 
was black and 613 cases where the victim was white. Overall, the prosecutor sought 
death in 336 of all the eligible capital cases between 1995 and 2004. The prosecutor 











Table 4  
Joint Frequency Distribution of the Prosecutor’s Decision to Seek Death and Race of the Homicide 
Victims 
 
  In an unadjusted analysis, the probability that the prosecutor will seek death in 
black victim cases is .16 (103/653) and .38 (233/619) in white victim cases. 
Therefore, the odds that a prosecutor will seek death are .19(.16/. 84) for cases 
involving black victims and .61 (.38/. 62) for cases involving white victims. 
Prosecutors are 3.21 times (.61/.19) more likely to seek death in white victim cases. 
These figures show us that there is increased risk that a prosecutor will seek the death 
penalty for those who murder whites compared to those that murder Blacks. 
Independent 
The main independent variable for this study was the race of the victim 
(whitevictim). This dummy variable was constructed as 1=white and 0=non-white 
11
. 
As previously stated, the categories included in the original data were white, black, 
American Indian or Alaskan Native, Other, Asian or Pacific Islander, Hispanic, 
Unknown, No Entry. I collapsed the race of victim into a dummy variable and 
dropped the cases of the other racial/ethnic groups because of their small distribution.  
                                                
11
 Cases that were included in the “white” category were those that had at least one white victim. The 
cases included in the “non-white” category were all black victims. 
Prosecutor’s Decision  Black Victim White Victim Total 
Death Sought 103 233 336 
Death Not Sought 550 386 936 
Total 653 619 1272 
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The cases that remain were evenly split between white and black. Of the 1272 cases, 
619 of the cases included at least one white victim (48.7%) and black victim cases 
accounted for 653 of the death eligible cases (51.3%). 
The other independent variables of interest were the combined defendant race 
and victim race on the odds that a prosecutor seeks the death penalty. The dummy 
variables blackkillswhite, whitekillsblack, blackkillsblack, whitekillswhite were all 
given the values of 1=yes, if the combination was present and 0=no, if the 
combination was absent. From Table 5 we can see that most capital murder cases are 
intra-racial. There were 975 intra-racial cases which accounted for 77% (975/1272) of 
all the cases. Of the interracial cases (297), black defendants killing white victims 
accounted for the majority of cases at 93% (276/297). Overall, cases involving black 
defendants accounted for 71% (908/1272) of the total caseload. 
 
 
Table 5  
Joint Frequency Distribution of the Race of Offender and Race of the Homicide Victims 
 
 Black Victim White Victim Total 
Black Offender 632 276 908  
White Offender 21 343 364  














Inevitably, there will always be factors that relate to either the independent or 
dependent variables in a relationship. The incorporation of controls is essential to 
ensuring that other possible explanations for the variation in Y are not ignored. Both 
legal and extra legal variables that could persuade a prosecutor to seek death were 
controlled for. 
The key legal factors included were the eight aggravators described in Table 
3
1213
. These aggravators were mainly included to determine whether the type of 
aggravator was important to the prosecutor. Also incorporated were factors that 
intuitively may influence a prosecutor to act more aggressively in pursuing a death 
sentence. For example, whether the defendant submitted a confession to the murder at 
any point in the murder investigation (1=yes, 0=no)
14
. Also included was a dummy 
variable of whether there was an eyewitness to the crime entered as evidence. Effort 
was made to include cases where DNA was entered into evidence but there were so 
few cases that the relevance of DNA could not be meaningfully analyzed. For violent 
crime (usually rape or homicide) only 5-10% of the universe of cases has biological 
evidence that can be scientifically tested and used as evidence.
15
  
                                                
12
 The fifth aggravator was excluded because there were no cases in the sample where a judicial 
officer was killed.  
13
 The eighth aggravator was excluded because there was only 1 case in the sample where an officer 
was killed and so the large odds ratio of a prosecutor seeking death in these types of cases was 
misleading 
14
 The evidence of a confession should not be confused with a plea agreement where the defendant 
recognizes their responsibility for the crime in a court of law and forgoes their right to take the case to 
the trial stage. It is not uncommon for defendants to confess, possibly during an interrogation, but then 





Other main case characteristics were dummy variables such as whether the 
crime was sex (e.g. sexual torture) related. Mitigating factors such as whether the 
crime was drugs or alcohol related (1=yes, 0=no) were also measured.  Yet another 
dummy variable looked at how heinous the crime was with regard to the number of 
victims that were killed. The multiple victim measure described whether the defendant 
had killed at least two victims (1=yes, 0=no). The dummy variable stranger (1=yes, 
0=no) approximated the relationship between the victim and the offender.  
Another included factor was a dummy variable called priorcon that described 
whether the defendant had at least one prior violent crime in their history before the 
current death eligible offense. Having no prior record could be considered a 
mitigating factor and having an extensive record could be considered an aggravating 
factor. An attempt was also made to get at geography and how that may impact case 
processing. The Baldus Study, as described in the previous chapter, had found that 
whether the crime had taken place in an urban setting mattered when it came to death 
case processing. The variable urban revealed whether the prosecutor was operating in 
an urban district (1=yes) or a rural/suburban district (0=no, not urban). Location may 
influence a prosecutor to seek death particularly if the crime takes place in a suburban 
community that does not have high rates of violent crime. Given that cities and urban 
centre have higher rates of violent crime, homicides in these locations may be viewed 
as more commonplace and so a prosecutor may be less likely to seek death. Finally, I 
controlled for the gender of the offender and victim (1=male, 0=female) and well as a 

































Variable Mean SD 
White Victim 0.49 0.50 
Black Kills White 0.22 0.41 
Black Kills Black 0.50 0.50 
White Kills White 0.27 0.44 





















Aggravator 10 0.01 0.12 
Drug related 0.26 0.44 
Sex related 0.05 0.23 
Alcohol related 0.08 0.28 
Stranger 0.23 0.42 
Urban 0.26 0.44 
Multiple Victims 0.13 0.34 
Eyewitness 0.41 0.49 
Confession 0.29 0.45 







Chapter 5:  Results 
 
Before analyzing the main models, I ran a preliminary model just to see if race 
of offender would have any effect. (1=white, 0=black). Despite my main focus on 
race of victim, I thought it would be important to confirm the findings of the earlier 
death penalty research (particularly the Baldus Study) suggesting that the race of 
defendant was not important. Table 7 shows us that cases involving white offenders 
are highly influential in a prosecutor’s decision to seek death. However, in Table 8 we 
see that when race of victim is included in the model, race of offender is no longer 
significant. There are two things that we can take away from this: (1) there is an 
effect for being a white offender (2) the effect is entirely due to the fact that white 


































































Variable b SE OR 
Offender Race .61*** .16 
 
1.84 
Offender Sex .16 .33 1.17 
Victim Sex -.29 .17 .74 
Prior Convictions -.04 .21 
.95 
Aggravator 1 .79*** .28 2.21 
Aggravator 2 1.23*** .26 3.43 
Aggravator 3 1.24*** .58 3.47 
Aggravator 4 .86*** .20 2.36 
Aggravator 6 1.57*** .34 
4.82 
Aggravator 7 1.60*** .17 
4.96 
Aggravator 9 1.42 .92 
4.17 
Aggravator 10 2.92*** .75 18.68 
Drug related -.57** .19 .563 
Sex related .86** .33 2.36 
Alcohol related .09 .28 1.09 
Stranger .81*** .19 2.26 
Urban -1.21*** .22 .29 
Multiple Victims 1.23*** .21 3.43 
Eyewitness .01 .16 1.01 
Confession .58*** .16 1.79 
Table 7 
Logistic Regression (Offender Race) 


































































Offender Sex .13 .32 1.14 
Victim Sex -.29 .17 .74 
Prior Convictions -.02 .22 
.97 
Aggravator 1 .79*** .28 2.21 
Aggravator 2 1.23*** .26 3.42 
Aggravator 3 1.34*** .59 3.85 
Aggravator 4 .77*** .20 2.16 
Aggravator 6 1.50*** .34 
4.48 
Aggravator 7 1.64 .17 
5.15 
Aggravator 9 1.33 .92 
3.79 
Aggravator 10 2.97*** .75 19.58 
Drug related -.47** .19 .62 
Sex related .84** .33 2.32 
Alcohol related .08 .28 1.08 
Stranger .62 .20 1.85 
Urban -.13*** .22 .32 
Multiple Victims 1.56*** .22 3.51 
Eyewitness .03 .16 1.03 
Confession .58*** .16 1.79 
    
Table 8 
Logistic Regression (Offender and Victim Races) 






 Table 9 shows the six regression outputs for the AJC Georgia data. In the first 
model, we can see that a number of the variables display a strong and significant 
relationship to the main dependent variable.  The key independent variable, race of 
victim, behaved positively and is highly significant at the .01 level (p=0.000). In other 
words, the killing of a white victim is significantly related to a prosecutor’s decision 
to seek the death penalty. If a defendant kills a white victim, the odds of a prosecutor 
seeking the death penalty are 2.229 times higher than if a defendant kills a black 
victim. At this point, before turning to racial combinations, it appears that the Baldus 
Study findings remain accurate in its portrayal of the Georgia capital sentencing 
system.  
Of the controls, it is not surprising to see that the majority of death eligible 
aggravators are significant and positively related to a prosecutor’s decision to seek 
death. A few observations stand out within the group of control variables. For 
example, whether a defendant confessed to the capital homicide at some point in the 
investigation increases the odds that a prosecutor would seek death. This is highly 
significant at the .01 level. Confessing to a capital murder exhibits a greater level of 
culpability than if a defendant did not confess. In addition, the killing of multiple 
victims also influences a prosecutor to seek death. In multiple victim cases, the odds 
increase by over 3.5 times compared to single victim cases. Killing multiple people 
most likely shows a degree of malevolence that may convince a prosecutor that a 




Logistic Regression (N=1272)  
 
 





Variable b SE OR  b SE OR  b SE OR 
White Victim .83*** .17 2.29         
           
Black Kills 
White 
   
 
   
 
   
           
Black Kills 
Black 
   
 
   
 
   
White Kills 
White 
   
 
   
 
.59*** .17 1.80 
White Kills 
Black 
   
 
.30 .58 1.34 
 
   
Offender Sex .12 .33 1.13  .07 .33 1.08  .16 .33 1.177 
Victim Sex -.28 .18 .75  -.27 .18 .77  -.28 .18 .754 
Offender Age -.10 .17 .91  -.14 .16 .87  -.08 .17 .928 
Prior 
Convictions 
-.06 .22 .95 
 
-.14 .22 .87 
 
.78 .29 2.188 
Aggravator 1 
 
.77** .30 2.17 
 
.75* .28 2.12 
 
1.241* .27 3.460 
Aggravator 2 
 
1.24*** .27 3.46 
 
1.27*** .26 3.58 
 
1.25*** .58 3.476 
Aggravator 3 
 
1.35* .59 3.88 
 
1.17* .58 3.26 
 
1.17*** .58 3.217 
Aggravator 4 
 
.77*** .20 2.16 
 
.88*** .20 2.47 
 
.88*** .20 2.408 
Aggravator 6 
 
1.50*** .34 4.49 
 
1.65*** .34 5.23 
 
1.65*** .34 5.226 
Aggravator 7 
 
1.65*** .18 5.18 
 
1.62*** .18 5.07 
 
1.62*** .18 5.072 
Aggravator 9 
 
1.31 .93 3.69 
 
1.30 .93 3.67 
 
1.30 .93 3.668 
Aggravator 10 
 
3.00*** .76 20.16 
 
3.04*** .78 20.99 
 
3.04*** .78 20.989 
Drug related 
 
-.47* .20 .63 
 
-.61** .20 .54 
 
-.55** .20 .576 
Sex related 
 
.84* .34 2.32 
 
.84* .33 2.31 
 
.86** .33 2.372 
Alcohol related 
 
.10 .28 1.10 
 
.20 .28 1.23 
 
.09 .28 1.093 
Stranger 
 
.60** .20 1.82 
 
.79*** .19 2.20 
 
.82*** .20 2.280 
Urban 
 
-1.15*** .22 .32 
 
-1.38*** .22 .25 
 
-1.23*** .22 .293 
Multiple 
Victims 
1.26*** .22 3.52 
 
1.27*** .22 3.56 
 
1.22*** .22 3.393 
Eyewitness .02 .17 1.02  -.04 .16 .96  .02 .17 1.015 
Confession .59*** .16 1.80  .60*** .16 1.82  .59*** .16 1.798 
            












Logistic Regression (N=1272) 
 
 





Variable b SE OR  b SE OR  b SE OR 
White Victim            
           
Black Kills 
White 
   
 
.37* .19 1.46 
 
.80*** .21 2.24 
           
Black Kills 
Black 
-.86 .17 .42 
 
   
 
   
White Kills 
White 
   
 
   
 
.90 .19 2.46 
White Kills 
Black 
   
 
   
 
.78*** .58 2.20 
Offender Sex .11 .32 1.12  .04 .32 1.04  .12 .32 1.13 
Victim Sex -.29 .17 .74  -.26 .17 .76  -.29 .18 .74 
Offender Age -.08 .16 .91  -.16 .16 .85  -.07 .16 .92 
Prior 
Convictions 
-.04 .22 .95 
 
-.15 .21 .85 
 
-.04 .22 .96 
Aggravator 1 
 
.77** .28 2.16 
 
.73** .28 2.08 
 
.77** .28 2.17 
Aggravator 2 
 
1.23*** .26 3.44 
 
1.27*** .26 3.58 
 
1.23*** .26 3.43 
Aggravator 3 
 
1.37* .59 3.94 
 
1.19* .58 3.3 
 
1.37* .59 3.94 
Aggravator 4 
 
.77*** .20 2.17 
 
.83*** .20 2.29 
 
.78*** .20 2.18 
Aggravator 6 
 
1.50*** .34 4.52 
 
1.63*** .34 5.12 
 
1.50*** .34 4.49 
Aggravator 7 
 
1.64*** .18 5.19 
 
1.64*** .17 5.19 
 
1.64*** .18 5.16 
Aggravator 9 
 
1.32 .93 3.74 
 
1.21 .93 3.36 
 
1.34 .93 3.83 
Aggravator 10 
 
3.01*** .76 20.47 
 
3.08*** .78 21.92 
 
3.00*** .76 20.09 
Drug related 
 
-.49* .19 .60 
 
-.56* .19 .56 
 
-.49* .20 .60 
Sex related 
 
.84* .33 2.31 
 
.82* .32 2.27 
 
.84* .33 2.32 
Alcohol related 
 
.09 .28 1.09 
 
.23 .28 1.25 
 
.07 .28 1.08 
Stranger 
 
.59** .19 1.81 
 
.67** .20 1.96 
 
.61** .20 1.84 
Urban 
 
-1.13*** .22 .32 
 
-1.36*** .21 .25 
 
-1.11*** .22 .32 
Multiple 
Victims 
1.28*** .22 3.57 
 
1.28*** .21 3.62 
 
1.26*** .22 3.54 
Eyewitness .02 .16 1.02  -.04 .16 .95  .02 .16 1.02 
Confession .59*** .16 1.81  .59*** .16 1.81  .59*** .16 1.80 
            





Also, cases where there are multiple victims may create public outcry for the toughest 
punishment. The relationship of the parties also has an influence on which sentence to 
pursue. When the victim is a stranger, the odds increase by more than 1.8 times than 
if the victim and offender are known to one another. The finding on geography also 
corresponds with the Baldus Study. Cases where the crime took place in a suburban 
setting are more likely to result in a prosecutor seeking death. 
Model 2 
 In this regression, the whitekillsblack combination is incorporated into the 
model. The data suggests that cases where white defendants kill black victims are not 
related to a prosecutor’s decision to seek death. This variable is highly insignificant. 
The relationship between the control variables and the dependent variables discussed 
in Model 1 are all relatively unchanged and so will not be repeated. In the data, 
offenders between the ages of 18 and 24 accounted for more than half of all capital 
murders but the prosecutor did not seem swayed by age in the slightest. 
Model 3 
 In this regression, the whitekillswhite combination is incorporated into the 
model. The data suggests that intraracial cases where white defendants kill white 
victims are significantly related to a prosecutors’ decision to seek death. This variable 
is highly significant at the .01 level. In these cases, the odds that a prosecutor will 
seek death are 1.8 times higher than all other cases. The relationship between the 
control variables and the dependent variables discussed in model 1 are relatively 





 In this regression, the blackkillsblack racial combination is incorporated into 
the model. The interesting story here is that compared to all other cases, black 
defendants that kill black victims have a significant inverse relationship to a 
prosecutor seeking death. This negative relationship is highly significant at the .01 
level. This means that cases where black offenders kill black victims are less likely to 
result in prosecutor’s seeking death. It is important to point out that this is the only 
racial combination where this takes place. Once again, the relationship between the 
control variables and the dependent variables discussed in Model 1 are relatively 
unchanged and so will not be repeated. 
Model 5 
 In this regression, I incorporated an independent variable accounting for cases 
where a black defendant kills a white victim (blackkillswhite ). The data suggests that 
in cases where black defendants kill white victims, the odds that a prosecutor will 
seek death are just under 1.5 times more compared to all other cases. This variable is 
somewhat significant at the .10 level. The relationship between the control variables 
and the dependent variables discussed in Model 1 are all somewhat similar in this 
model. It is important to point out that it appears that the odds of a prosecutor seeking 
death is higher in cases when both the offender and victim are white. However, this 





 This model compared all the racial combinations to the blackkillsblack 
variable. The data suggests that the racial combinations of blackkillswhite and 
whitekillswhite, compared to blackkillsblack cases are significantly related to a 
prosecutor’s decision to seek death.  These two racial combinations both had highly 
significant p-values (0.000). It is also important to point out that the beta values of 
these combinations (0.8 and 0.78 respectively) show that race of defendant is not a 
critical aspect in these outcomes. The race of the victim seems to be driving the 
relationship. In this model, we also notice that the whitekillsblack is non-significant.  
In cases where a white defendant kills a white victim, the odds of the 
prosecutor seeking death are 2.3 times higher than when a black offender kills a black 
victim. In cases where a black offender kills a white victim, the odds increase by 2.1 
times compared to a case where a black defendant kills a black victim.
16
 Interracial 
murders are more commonplace and so that fact provides a good explanation for why 
it might appear that a prosecutor would target a white on white murder more so than 
an interracial one. To data suggests that the race of victim is paramount. 
Predicted Probabilities 
 Predicted probabilities are useful in determining the likelihood that an event 
will occur [(success/(success*failure)] as opposed to the “odds of something 
occurring” as a ratio (success: failure). Figures 3-10 display the predicted 
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 While gender issues are not the focal concern of my research, I did run a separate regression and 
created a variable, whitefem, from the sample of female victims (n=414).  My goal was to delve into 
the notion that the lives of white victims (particularly females) are considered more valuable in the 
eyes of the justice system. This relationship, while controlling for all the same factors as my main 
models, turned up positive and significant (p-value=.013) where the odds that a prosecutor would seek 




probabilities that a prosecutor will seek death for each of the six main models. When 
looking solely at the race of victim, the probability that a prosecutor will seek death is 
0.24 in cases of white victims and 0.13 in cases of black victims. This means that 
prosecutors are nearly twice times as likely to pursue death in cases where victims are 






In Figure 4, the probability that a prosecutor will seek death in cases where a black 
defendant kills a black victim is 0.19 compared to 0.27 in all other cases. In other 
words, a prosecutor is significantly less likely to find an offender that murders a black 





In Figure 5, not surprisingly, we see that when a black offender kills a white 
victim, compared to all other cases, the chance that the prosecutor will seek death is 
higher. This is in contrast to Figure 4 when we see the prosecutor less concerned in 
pursuing death (compared to other cases) if the victim and offender are black. In 
Figure 6, the non-significant relationship indicates that a white defendant killing a 
black victim has no impact on the prosecutor’s decision to seek death. Once again, 





In Figure 7, the probability that a white killing another white person will result 
in the prosecutor seeking death is 0.19 compared to all other cases (0.17). To reiterate 
findings discussed earlier, this is most likely due to the fact that white offenders 




the part of the prosecutor to seek death. This trend remains consist throughout the 
results. 
 
The next selection of figures compares the racial combination to cases where a black 
defendant kills a black victim. In Figure 8, we learn that a prosecutor is about 2.3 
times more likely to pursue the death penalty when a white person kills another white 
person than in black intra-racial killings. Figure 9 once again shows that killing a 
white person increases the prospect of a prosecutor seeking death by 2.25 times. The 
race of defendant is not crucial to the dependent variable but the race of victim is 













Finally, Figure 10 displays a non-significant relationship when comparing a white 







Chapter 6:  Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 
 The role of the prosecutor in deciding whether or not a capital crime warrants 
the death penalty is an important stage because it incorporates a wide range of 
discretion that often gets overlooked. The goal was to determine if the past findings 
of Baldus et al. (1990), which suggested Georgia’s death penalty system suffers from 
serious racial bias, were still true. In conclusion, the results show that racial bias may 
still be a problem in the Georgia capital sentencing system. The office of the 
prosecutor may still be perpetuating racist practices. 
My first hypothesis is supported by this investigation because when looking 
solely at the race of victim, it is clear that prosecutors are harsher on defendants that 
kill white victims. On a brighter note, the odds of a prosecutor seeking death in white 
victim cases (approx 2.2) seem to have greatly diminished to just under half of what 
was found in the Baldus Study (approx 3.5). Even though race of victim is still a 
relevant variable, it has become less so since the 1970s. Any degree of racial 
prejudice is problematic, however, it is a positive finding that race of victim appears 
to be losing its influence on the death penalty system. The argument could be made 
that while racial practices may still exist, the legal prescriptions enacted in 1976 to 
address disparity in the death penalty is showing some promise. 
 My second hypothesis was rejected because cases where white offenders kill 
white victims have slightly higher odds of the prosecutor seeking death instead of 
cases where a black offender kills a white victim, which is a close second. However, 




for this. White offenders kill white victims at higher rates and which could be why 
white intraracial homicides are more likely to be targeted by the prosecutor. 
Moreover, the difference in the size of the coefficients for these two racial 
combinations are negligible and thus gives weight to the finding that race of 
defendant is not driving the relationship. The third hypothesis was supported. The 
only negative and significant racial combination was blackkillsblack. In other words, 
black defendants that kill black victims are less likely to result in a prosecutor seeking 
death. All other racial combinations have higher odds that a prosecutor will seek 
death compared to the blackkillsblack independent variable. 
 My findings support the United States General Accounting Office study, 
which concluded that the majority of studies (82% ) on disparity and sentencing have 
found race of victim to be a consistent factor in prosecutor decision-making (GAO, 
1990). In cases where black defendants kill black victims, the negative and highly 
significant relationship fuels the idea that the justice system is still more concerned 
with seeking justice for the lives of white victims. In addition, the results for the 
current study imply that we need to be more cognizant of the more subtle forms of 
racism that the Georgia capital sentencing system may be perpetuating. If cases 
involving white victims are more likely to garner aggressive prosecution, there 
remains the question of why black victims are not afforded the same response. 
 All of the legal aggravators in the models were positively related to the 
dependent variable. The vast majority of these controls were highly significant with 
only a couple falling just outside of the 0.10 significance range. When it came to the 




more likely to pursue the death penalty if they are within a suburban or rural setting 
and less likely if they are in an urban setting. While my investigation is not designed 
to consider this question in detail, it is important to mention that geography has been 
found to be a relevant factor in other states (Paternoster et al., 2004).  
 One possible explanation is the connection between race and geography. 
Minority groups are more likely to be clustered within urban areas whereas whites 
usually spread out to the surrounding suburban neighborhoods outside city limits 
(Welch, 2001). With the strong finding that those who kill whites are more likely to 
receive the death penalty, an inference could be made that since whites mostly live in 
suburban/rural locales it is understandable that this control variable would also be 
significant.  
 At first glance I was somewhat perplexed by the non-significant eyewitness 
variable. A possible reason for this finding could be that eyewitness evidence is 
important for the conviction stage but may not be as important for the subsequent 
sentencing stage. At the point of sentencing, guilt has already been established and so 
whether there is an eyewitness may not sway the prosecutor either way.  
 The variable prior convictions displayed a negative and non-significant 
relationship to the outcome. It is possible that priors may not have been measured 
consistently. It was unclear whether priors only included felony convictions for 








Paternoster and Brame (2008) point to a recent criticism of the usage of 
regression based models. The argument follows that regression analysis is a limitation 
in the research on race and capital sentencing because race is not the type of variable 
that can be manipulated therefore leaving one unable to determine what would 
happen if a victim’s race were different. In other words, regression analysis creates 
implausible counterfactuals (976). In response to such criticisms, and in defense of 
the chosen method for the current study, Paternoster and Brame (2008) concede that 
while it is true that one must be “careful in making causal inferences in the absence of 
direct manipulation” (978), it is still a useful approach to compare the outcomes of 
similar capital cases for people in different racial categories. Of course, this statistical 
method may not be ideal but it can still inform the researcher and wider audience 
about the possible consequences of race even though one cannot prove that race has 
had a direct causal impact on the prosecutor in making a decision. Overt 
discrimination, which may be manifested in the race of offender effects, should be 
distinguished from covert discrimination, which may be manifested in race of victim 
effects. 
 The primary sample was unable to allow for meaningful evaluation for 
race/ethnicity effects for other demographic groups. It may be that the outcomes are 
different for Hispanic, Asian, or Native American offenders or victims. It is difficult 
to garner solid data on these groups because of their small number in the capital 
sentencing system. Determining how these groups compare to blacks and whites was 




 Although the study was not intended to be a replication of the Baldus Study, it 
was clearly not as extensive compared to the 400 variables that Baldus and colleagues 
were able to analyze for Georgia. Also, not having much information about the 
criminal history of the offender beyond the relevant murder conviction was 
problematic. Securing a more detailed criminal history of the offender is useful 
because it acts as another legally relevant variable that the prosecutor might use.  The 
Baldus Study was better able to control for detailed offender and victim background 
characteristics.  
 Another limitation is that a small number of the cases in the data had multiple 
victims where the victims were more than one race. Although this was not common, 
there were instances were both a black and white victim were murdered. While I 
highly doubt that a handful of cases could completely skew the data, it is an important 
issue to keep in mind when interpreting the results.  
 Another limitation in the data is not having much background on the 
prosecutor. Since discretion is critical to the role of the prosecutor, it would have been 
helpful to incorporate individual factors about the prosecutor that may affect the way 
they make decisions. For example, it may have been relevant to look at years of 
experience as a district attorney or past history of prosecutorial misconduct. 
Theoretical Implications 
 From these findings, an argument could be made that colorblind racism and 
the racial threat perspective continue to offer the more realistic interpretation of race 
rather than the ‘post-racial America’ perspective. The bulk of racism seems to be 




defendants, the death penalty avenges the lives of white victims. Ogletree and Sarat 
(2006) find that capital punishment is a “living embodiment of a system of white 
privilege” (264).  
 What is certain is that although the results of the current study suggest that we 
may be moving in the right direction, we are still far from the extreme of pure justice 
on the continuum of discrimination and disparity (see Figure 1). Also, there is support 
for the conflict perspective because it appears that criminal activity committed against 
whites is deemed to be more criminal than if the activity is committed against blacks. 
Once again, this reinforces the perception that the law remains committed to 
protecting the dominant class/racial group. 
Policy Implications 
 Paternoster et al. (2004) offers that although the vast majority of cases have 
found race effects in capital sentencing, this “does not mean that [prosecutors] are 
motivated by intentional racial prejudice or bigotry” (48). The researchers noted that 
a survey of Maryland’s State’s Attorneys revealed that prosecutors would use the 
wishes of family members of victims in deciding whether to purse the death penalty. 
It may be possible that families of what victims are more likely to push for the death 
penalty than family members of black victim. 
 In 2003, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that 59% of whites felt that 
the death penalty was applied fairly while only 32% of blacks agreed with that 
statement (BJS, 2003). The chasm between white and black opinions on the fairness 
of capital punishment exemplifies a society where a large portion remains 




of victim may be less relevant in capital sentencing today than in the past, it may take 
alot more to change the perception that many blacks continue to have of capital 
punishment. The difference in opinions between blacks and whites on the death 
penalty may take much more time to converge.  
 In 2006, the American Bar Association released a report that included 
recommendations on how to improve prosecutorial misconduct more broadly. 
However, the report also touched on discretion and how it can either be supervised or 
restricted to make case processing more transparent. A main argument they presented 
was that the numerous aggravating factors under death penalty legislation could 
virtually render most murders death-eligible. However, most murders are not charged 
as such. The ABA recommended that each prosecutor’s office create written policies 
governing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to ensure the fair, efficient, and 
effective enforcement of criminal law (American Bar Association, 2006).  This is a 
step in the right direction. It is possible that policy initiatives requiring states 
attorney’s offices to document and justify their decisions can help open up this black 
box.  
 In 1995, there was a revision of the Federal Death Penalty Protocol requiring 
all federal prosecutors to submit for review all cases where capital charges could be 
pursued, regardless of whether the federal prosecutor would have pursued a death 
sentence (RAND, 2006). A Federal review committee was established were all cases 
fitting this criteria would be dissected. A final recommendation would then be 
forwarded to the U.S Attorney General who would make the final decision about 




of the offender or victim is excluded from the case information to make it truly 
‘colorblind’ (RAND, 2006).  There is available research suggesting that the Federal 
capital sentencing system has been able to avoid the taint of racially biased 
sentencing (DOJ, 2001; RAND, 2006). 
 One idea may be to have state level capital sentencing systems mirror that of 
the federal system to see if they can accomplish the apparent success of the federal 
system. Centralizing decision making and taking away discretion of the individual 
prosecutors, as in the federal system, may help to address bias issues. Also, the fact 
that case review is ‘colorblind’ may also act as a deterrent to racially charged decision 
making.  
Future Research/Legal Change 
 Although I have focused on the prosecutor throughout this study, I recognize 
that there may be bias in other stages in the justice funnel. Changes to the role of the 
prosecutor will not resolve all disparity issues. For example, law enforcement officers 
are the first to uncover crime and initiate investigation. An interesting study may be 
to research whether police spend more time investigating cases of white 
victimization, increasing the probability of arrest, conviction and sentencing. Another 
area for future research might be to estimate multi-level models that include 
jurisdiction and characteristics of the jurisdiction such as racial makeup, education, 
incomes, etc. This study finds that urban vs. rural/suburban matters. It would be 
interesting to see what exactly it is about these areas that make them relevant to the 




Finally, another interesting route for research might be to determine if racial 
effects are addressed at the appellate level (Georgia’s Supreme Court review). It may 
be that we already have checks and balances in the system to correct for disparity at 
earlier stages.  
Conclusion 
Furman v. Georgia symbolized the justice system’s acknowledgement of a 
‘dual’ or two-tiered justice system; that is, a system where laws were applied 
differently in similar contexts. The finality of death gives us the right to demand that 
our legal system mete out punishments in a fair and impartial way. The only thing 
more frustrating than knowing racial disparity persists in capital sentencing, even 
after controlling for important factors, is not knowing why it occurs.   
It is highly unusual that the public knows so little about the domain of the 
prosecutor when it comes to decision making, even though the prosecutor is a critical 
figure in capital sentencing. This society has made important steps to move beyond 
the ugly history of racial intolerance. We have now entered into an era where 
prejudice exists in new and implicit forms. While race of victim seems to matter less 
today than it did in the past, it is still influential in the state of Georgia. The current 
study focused on the prosecutor but the issue is much bigger than any single role. 
Other justice actors contribute to these outcomes as well and all must take 
responsibility.  It may not be possible to completely eradicate our justice system of 
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